

BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER
OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

DAVID H. STRINGER,
Bar No. 019604

Respondent

PDJ 2021-9109

**FINAL JUDGMENT AND
ORDER**

[State Bar No. 20-1555]

FILED JANUARY 19, 2022

The Presiding Disciplinary Judge accepted the parties' Agreement for Discipline by Consent submitted pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondent, **DAVID H. STRINGER, Bar No. 019604**, is reprimanded for his conduct in violation of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, as outlined in the consent documents.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona in the amount of \$ 1,200.00, within 30 days from the date of service of this order.

DATED this 19th day of January 2022.

Margaret H. Downie

Margaret H. Downie
Presiding Disciplinary Judge

Copies of the foregoing emailed
this 19th day of January 2022, to:

Carmen A. Chenal Horne
Carmen C. Horne Law Firm, PLLC
7272 E. Indian School Road, Suite 540
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251-3996
Email: carmenchenallaw@gmail.com
Respondent's Counsel

Kelly J. Flood
Staff Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
Email: LRO@staff.azbar.org

by: SHunt

BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF THE
STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

DAVID H. STRINGER,
Bar No. 019604

Respondent

PDJ 2021-9109

**DECISION ACCEPTING
AGREEMENT FOR DISCIPLINE BY
CONSENT**

[State Bar No. 20-1555]

FILED JANUARY 19, 2022

On December 17, 2021, the parties filed an Agreement for Discipline by Consent (“Agreement”) pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. The State Bar of Arizona is represented in this matter by Kelly J. Flood. Respondent David H. Stringer is represented by Carmen A. Chenal Horne. A probable cause order issued on November 15, 2021, but no formal complaint has been filed.

Contingent on approval of the proposed form of discipline, Mr. Stringer has voluntarily waived his right to an adjudicatory hearing, as well as all motions, defenses, objections, or requests that could be asserted. As required by Rule 53(b)(3), notice of the Agreement was sent to the complainant by letter dated December 10, 2021. No objection has been received. Based on Mr. Stringer’s conditional admission that he violated ER 8.2(a), the Agreement states that a reprimand plus the payment of costs to the State Bar is the appropriate sanction.

As originally written, the Agreement stated that the presumptive sanction under the *ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions* is a reprimand pursuant to Standard 7.3, which

provides that a reprimand is generally appropriate “when a lawyer *negligently* engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.” (Emphasis added.) However, the Agreement states that Mr. Stringer “*knowingly* approved campaign materials that were in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” (Emphasis added.) “Knowing” conduct implicates Standard 7.2, which calls for a presumptive sanction of suspension.

The PDJ issued an order on December 23, 2021, stating that the Agreement could not be approved as written, but giving the parties leave to supplement by “explaining why the stipulated reprimand is appropriate, notwithstanding Mr. Stringer’s agreed-upon mental state.” The parties filed a supplement to the Agreement on January 14, 2022.

The Agreement and supplement detail a factual basis in support of Mr. Stringer’s conditional admissions, and they are incorporated by reference. *See* Rule 57(a)(4). Mr. Stringer admits violating Rule 42, ER 8.2(a), while running for public office. As the Agreement states:

Respondent’s campaign materials used the likeness of a Federal judge, and mischaracterized language from the judge’s order that had been vacated, in order to impugn the character of his opponent, who was also a public legal officer under ER 8.2(a). Additionally, Respondent’s materials mischaracterized state court rulings about his opponent to suggest that state courts had determined she was dishonest.

In the supplement to the Agreement, the parties acknowledge that suspension is the presumptive sanction under Standard 7.2. They stipulate to the existence of aggravating factors 9.22(b) (selfish or dishonest motive) and 9.22(i) (substantial experience in the practice of law), and mitigating factors 9.32(a) (absence of prior disciplinary offenses) and 9.32(e)

(full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude towards proceedings).

In explaining the proposed deviation from the presumptive sanction of suspension, the parties state:

This appears to be an isolated incident that occurred during a political campaign, and the conduct was unrelated to Respondent's actual practice of law or any client matters. Respondent relied on political consultants experienced in Arizona elections to produce his campaign materials. He agrees there is a basis to find that he did not provide adequate supervision to the non-lawyers who designed the mailers in question. Respondent agrees that he knowingly approved the mailers without having independently verified their content.

Based on the *Standards* and in light of the facts and circumstances of this matter, the parties conditionally agree that the sanction [of reprimand] is within the range of appropriate sanction and will serve the purposes of lawyer discipline.

"Lawyer discipline serves two main purposes: (1) to protect the public and the courts and (2) to deter the attorney and others from engaging in the same or similar misconduct." *In re Zawada*, 208 Ariz. 232, 236 (2004). The objective is not to punish the offender. *In re Peasley*, 208 Ariz. 27, 38 (2004). Given Mr. Stringer's lack of disciplinary history and the parties' avowal that this appears to be an "isolated incident" of misconduct unrelated to the active practice of law, the PDJ agrees that a reprimand plus the payment of costs will serve the objectives of lawyer discipline.

IT IS ORDERED accepting the Agreement for Discipline by Consent. A final judgment and order is signed this date.

DATED this 19th day of January 2022.

Margaret H. Downie
Margaret H. Downie
Presiding Disciplinary Judge

COPY of the foregoing e-mailed
this 19th day of January 2022 to:

Kelly J. Flood
Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
Phoenix, AZ 85016-6288
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Respondent's Counsel

by: SHunt

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Respondent's Counsel

BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER
OF THE STATE BAR OF
ARIZONA,**

**DAVID H. STRINGER,
Bar No. 019604,**

Respondent.

PDJ 2021 -9109

State Bar File No. **20-1555**

**AGREEMENT FOR DISCIPLINE
BY CONSENT**

The State Bar of Arizona, and Respondent David H. Stringer who is represented in this matter by counsel, Carmen A. Chenal Horne, hereby submit their Agreement for Discipline by Consent pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. A probable cause order was entered on November 15, 2021, but no formal

complaint has been filed in this matter. Respondent voluntarily waives the right to an adjudicatory hearing, unless otherwise ordered, and waives all motions, defenses, objections or requests which have been made or raised, or could be asserted thereafter, if the conditional admission and proposed form of discipline is approved.

Pursuant to Rule 53(b)(3), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., notice of this agreement was provided to the complainant by email and letter on December 10, 2021. Complainant has been notified of the opportunity to file a written objection to the agreement with the State Bar within five (5) business days of bar counsel's notice. Copies of Complainants' objections, if any, have been or will be provided to the presiding disciplinary judge.

Respondent conditionally admits that his conduct, as set forth below, violated Rule 42, ER 8.2(a). Upon acceptance of this agreement, Respondent agrees to accept imposition of the following discipline: **Reprimand**. Respondent also agrees to pay the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceeding, within 30 days from the date of this order. If costs are not paid within the 30 days interest

will begin to accrue at the legal rate.¹ The State Bar's Statement of Costs and Expenses is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

FACTS

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

1. Respondent was licensed to practice law in Arizona on January 6, 2004.

COUNT ONE (File No. 20-1555/ Polk)

2. Sheila Polk and Respondent were political opponents in the 2020 Yavapai County Attorney Republican Party primary. In July of 2020, Respondent and his campaign mailed various postcards that contained allegations regarding judicial rulings concerning Polk's conduct as Yavapai County Attorney. Relevant mailings are excerpted here:

¹ Respondent understands that the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceeding include the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona, the Disciplinary Clerk, the Probable Cause Committee, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge and the Supreme Court of Arizona.

Sheila Polk is being **sued** in federal court – for her lies about her political opponents. **Polk abused** her position to try to punish a political opponent.

• THE DESK OF JUDGE STEVEN LOGAN •

TO: THOMAS & SHEILA POLK
FROM: FEDERAL JUDGE STEVEN LOGAN

Federal Judge Steven Logan described Sheila Polk's conduct as County Attorney as

"... the exact opposite of the fairness, independence and impartiality becoming of a judicial or quasi-judicial authority."

DON'T BELIEVE THE LIES!

Now she's **LYING** the ugliest lies imaginable to try and **SAVE** her career.

3.

CAN WE TRUST SHEILA POLK?

FACT #1: David Stringer has spent 40 years in the law, has been admitted to multiple state Bar Associations, and has an unblemished record as an attorney.

FACT #2: Sheila Polk has been in political office for the last 20 years has been cited by an Attorney General and the Arizona Supreme Court for lying about her political opponents.

FACT #3: Sheila Polk supported Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump.

FACT #4: Sheila Polk supports amnesty for illegal immigrants.

FACT #5: DAVID STRINGER IS 100% PRO-TRUMP. PRO-WALL. PRO-DEPORTATION FOR CRIMINAL ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS.

ATTORNEY GENERAL HORNE SAYS SHEILA POLK IS A DANGER TO EVERY CITIZEN OF YAVAPAI COUNTY.

"Someone who is willing to abuse her prosecutor power is a danger to every citizen in Yavapai County"


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Paid for by Conservatives For Stringer - Authorized by David Stringer

DAVID STRINGER
COUNTY ATTORNEY

PUBLIC SAFETY JOB #1
DEFEND 2ND AMENDMENT
STOP ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

www.VOTESTRINGER.COM



4.

7. Respondent has acknowledged that he reviewed and approved the campaign materials.

8. The background regarding the litigation referred to in the postcards is as follows:

9. *Horne I*: On June 27, 2013, acting pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-924(A) (2011) repealed by 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 79, § 10 (2d Reg. Sess.), Arizona Secretary of State Ken Bennett determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that Attorney General Thomas Horne, Kathleen Winn, who served as Community Outreach Director of the Attorney General's Office, and two campaign committees (collectively "Horne parties") had violated Arizona campaign finance laws, specifically A.R.S. §§ 16-901(14), -905, -913, -915, -917, and -919. The Secretary accordingly notified Solicitor General Robert L. Ellman, who appointed Sheila Polk as Special Arizona Attorney General because the Attorney General and one of his staffers were subjects of the notice, and "an appearance of impropriety would arise if the Arizona Attorney General's Office investigated the alleged campaign finance violation."

10. Following investigation, pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-924(A), Polk issued a twenty-five-page order finding that the Horne parties had violated Arizona

campaign finance statutes by illegally coordinating campaign expenditures, exceeding contribution limits, and collecting illegal contributions. Polk directed the Horne parties to amend campaign finance reports and ordered Horne and his campaign to refund contributions totaling approximately \$397,000. The order stated that if the Horne parties failed to take the specified actions within twenty days, “this Office will issue an Order Assessing a Civil Penalty pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-924(B). The violation of the contribution limit carries a civil penalty of three times the amount of money of the violation. A.R.S. § 16-905(J).”

11. The Horne parties requested an administrative hearing pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-924(A). After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision finding that Polk had failed to prove illegal coordination and recommending that Polk vacate her compliance order. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(B) (2000), Polk issued her final administrative decision, which rejected the ALJ recommendation and affirmed her prior compliance order. Polk accepted all of the ALJ’s findings of fact and rejected in part the ALJ’s conclusions of law.

12. The Horne parties appealed to the Maricopa County Superior Court, challenging Polk’s decision as well as the constitutionality of Arizona’s campaign

contribution limits (*Horne I*). Neither side requested an evidentiary hearing. The court affirmed Polk's decision, finding that substantial evidence supported it and rejecting challenges to the statutory scheme. The Horne parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Polk's answering brief acknowledged a fact previously unknown to the Horne parties: "Admittedly, the Yavapai County Attorney was involved with the prosecution of the case, by assisting with the preparation and strategy." The Horne parties argued that Polk's role as advocate and adjudicator violated their due process rights.

13. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court, concluding that "[b]ecause there was evidence in the record supporting Polk's finding that Horne and Winn coordinated . . . , we find no abuse of discretion." *Horne v. Polk*, 1 CA-CV 14-0837, at *5 ¶ 12 (Ariz. App. Feb. 23, 2016). The court rejected the Horne parties' due process claim, relying on *Comeau v. Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners*, 196 Ariz. 102, 108 ¶ 26, 993 P.2d 1066, 1072 (App. 1999) ("An agency is permitted to combine some functions of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication unless actual bias or partiality is shown.") *Horne*, 1 CA-CV 14-0837, at *11, ¶ 13. The court concluded, "In this case, appellants make no showing of actual bias. Accordingly, their due process rights were not violated."

14. On May 25, 2017, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, finding that due process does not allow the same person to serve as an accuser, advocate, and final decisionmaker in an agency adjudication. *Horne v. Polk*, 394 P.3d 651 (Ariz. 2017). The Court found that an “agency head may supervise personnel involved in such functions; but if she makes the final agency decision, she must be isolated from advocacy functions and strategic prosecutorial decision-making and must supervise personnel involved in those functions in an arms-length fashion.” *Id.* at ¶ 27. The Court further held “that when Polk also assumed an advocacy role during the Administrative Law Judge’s proceedings, the due process guarantee prohibited her from then serving as the final adjudicator.” *Id.* at ¶ 28.

15. *Horne II*: In 2018, the Horne parties sued Polk in Arizona District Court, under 42 USC § 1983, alleging Polk violated their due process rights by serving as both an advocate and adjudicator (*Thomas Horne, et al., v. Sheila Sullivan Polk*, CV-18-08010-SPL). Polk moved to dismiss, arguing *inter alia* that she was entitled to judicial immunity and that plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred. On February 26, 2019, the district court denied Polk’s motion. In its Order denying the motion, the district court wrote:

“The defendant's participation as both a prosecutor and adjudicatory authority for the Administrative Action is the exact opposite of the fairness, independence and impartiality becoming of a judicial or quasi – judicial authority. Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant was not acting in a quasi-judicial role when reversing the Administrative Judge's decision pursuant to Ariz.Rev. Stat. Ann. section 41 – 1092.08, and the defendant is not protected by absolute immunity for any claims arising out of her reversal of the administrative judge's decision.” (Doc. #20, at page 6.)


16. Polk filed a motion for reconsideration, and on April 17, 2019, the district court granted Polk’s motion, vacating its February 26, 2019 Order. The district court held that *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), did not apply to toll the Horne parties’ cause of action, and therefore accrual was not tolled pending the Arizona Supreme Court’s May 25, 2017 decision that Polk had violated the Horne parties’ due process rights. Therefore, the district court dismissed the case based solely on the statute of limitations issue. The Horne parties appealed, and Polk cross-appealed the denial of judicial immunity.

17. On June 25, 2020, the 9th Circuit issued a memorandum decision affirming the district court, finding the Horne parties’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Because the court affirmed dismissal of the action on that basis, it did not reach the issue of judicial immunity.

18. On October 14, 2020, the Horne parties filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which was denied on February 22, 2021.

19. Against this background regarding the litigation to which Respondent refers in his campaign materials, certain representations are excerpted and discussed below:

“The Desk of Judge Steven Logan” and “From: Federal Judge Steven Logan”



20. Judge Logan was unaware of Respondent’s campaign mailings until they were brought to his attention. He did not and would not approve of the use of his likeness in any campaign materials. Judge Logan confirmed that the quoted language was from an order that he had vacated on April 17, 2019.

21. Further, Judge Logan did not believe that Respondent’s language stating “Federal Judge Steven Logan described Sheila Polk’s conduct as County Attorney as...” was a fair representation of his earlier, now vacated order because it suggests that he believes, in his capacity as a federal judge, that Polk is generally

not fair, not independent, not impartial, and was dishonest in her role as County Attorney. The language used in his Order applied only to the facts of the case; it was not a comment on Polk's overall character or performance as an elected official.

22. Respondent's materials also claimed:

County Attorney Sheila Polk has already been caught in court, lying about her political enemies & was even cited by a judge for unethical conduct. Now she's losing, desperate, and lying about David Stringer.

FACT #2: The Arizona Supreme Court ruled against Sheila Polk and her political lies.

Sheila Polk is being **sued** in federal court – for her lies about her political opponents. **Polk abused** her position to try to punish a political opponent.

FACT #3: Sheila Polk is currently being sued in the 9th District Circuit Court for her political lies.

23. As discussed above, the *Horne II* was dismissed on April 17, 2019. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on June 25, 2020. Respondent's postcards were mailed July 7, 2020.

24. The Complaint in *Horne II* alleges due process violations but does not reference lies or factual misrepresentations by Polk.

25. Additionally, in *Horne I* the Arizona Supreme Court addressed solely the due process issue presented by Polk acting as both prosecutor and adjudicator, and made no determination that Polk had been dishonest in how she handled the Horne parties' alleged campaign violations. The Court specifically noted that the Horne parties had not alleged any actual bias on Polk's part. (¶¶ 16 and 28.)

26. Respondent's conduct as set forth above violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., ER 8.2(a).

CONDITIONAL ADMISSIONS

Respondent's admissions are being tendered in exchange for the form of discipline stated below and are submitted freely and voluntarily and not as a result of coercion or intimidation. Respondent conditionally admits that he violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., specifically, ER 8.2(a).

CONDITIONAL DISMISSALS

There are no conditional dismissals.

RESTITUTION

Restitution is not an issue in this matter.

SANCTION

Respondent and the State Bar of Arizona agree that based on the facts and circumstances of this matter, as set forth above, the following sanction is appropriate: Reprimand.

LEGAL GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF SANCTION

In determining an appropriate sanction, the parties consulted the American Bar Association's *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards)* pursuant to Rule 57(a)(2)(E). The *Standards* are designed to promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by identifying relevant factors that courts should consider and then applying those factors to situations where lawyers have engaged in various types of misconduct. *Standards* 1.3, Commentary. The *Standards* provide guidance with respect to an appropriate sanction in this matter.

In determining an appropriate sanction the Court considers the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. *Standard* 3.0.

The parties agree that the following *Standard 7.0* Violations of Other Duties Owed as a Professional applies. Standard 7.3 provides that a Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal profession.

Here, Respondent's campaign materials used the likeness of a Federal judge, and mischaracterized language from the judge's order that had been vacated, in order to impugn the character of his opponent, who was also a public legal officer under ER 8.2(a). Additionally, Respondent's materials mischaracterized state court rulings about his opponent to suggest that state courts had determined she was dishonest.

The duty violated

Respondent's conduct violated his duty to the profession, and the public.

The lawyer's mental state

Respondent knowingly approved campaign materials that were in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The extent of the actual or potential injury

There was potential harm to the profession, and the public, because Respondent's campaign materials disseminated to the public made it appear that a Federal judge had impugned the character of a public legal officer, and the materials misrepresented state court holdings to suggest that state courts had determined that a public legal officer was dishonest.

Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

The presumptive sanction is Reprimand. The parties conditionally agree that the following aggravating and mitigating factors should be considered:

In aggravation:

- a) 9.22(b) dishonest or selfish motive: Respondent was running a political campaign and was interested in making it appear that state and federal judges had determined that his opponent was dishonest; and
- b) 9.22(i) substantial experience in the practice of law: Respondent was admitted to practice in 2004.

In mitigation:

- a) 9.32(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record.

b) 9.32(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings.

Discussion

The presumptive sanction should of Reprimand is appropriate under the circumstances. No probation is warranted because this appears to be an isolated incident that occurred during a political campaign, and the conduct was unrelated to Respondent's actual practice of law or any client matters.

Based on the *Standards* and in light of the facts and circumstances of this matter, the parties conditionally agree that the sanction set forth above is within the range of appropriate sanction and will serve the purposes of lawyer discipline.


CONCLUSION

The object of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public, the profession and the administration of justice. In re *Peasley*, 208 Ariz. 27 (2004). Recognizing that determination of the appropriate sanction is the prerogative of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, the State Bar and Respondent believe that the objectives of discipline will be met by the imposition of the

proposed sanction of Reprimand and the imposition of costs and expenses. A proposed form of order is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

DATED this 17th day of December 2021.

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA



Kelly J. Flood
Staff Bar Counsel

This agreement, with conditional admissions, is submitted freely and voluntarily and not under coercion or intimidation.

DATED this 14th day of December, 2021.

David H. Stringer
Respondent

DATED this 15th day of December, 2021.

Carmen C. Horne Law Firm, PLLC

Carmen A. Chenal Horne Esq.
Counsel for Respondent

proposed sanction of Reprimand and the imposition of costs and expenses. A proposed form of order is attached hereto as Exhibit B.


DATED this _____ day of December 2021.

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA

Kelly J. Flood
Staff Bar Counsel

This agreement, with conditional admissions, is submitted freely and voluntarily and not under coercion or intimidation.

DATED this 14th day of December, 2021.



David H. Stringer
Respondent

DATED this _____ day of December, 2021.

Carmen C. Horne Law Firm, PLLC

DATED this _____ day of 12/15/2021.

David H. Steiner
Respondent

DATED this _____ day of 12/15/2021.

Carmen C. Horne Law Firm, PLLC


Carmen C. Horne Esq.
Counsel for Respondent

12/15/2021

Approved as to form and content

Maret Vessella
Chief Bar Counsel

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk of
the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
this _____ day of 12/15/2021.

Approved as to form and content



Maret Vessella
Chief Bar Counsel

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk of
the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
this 17th day of December, 2021.

Copy of the foregoing emailed
this 17th day of December, 2021, to:

The Honorable Margaret H. Downie
Presiding Disciplinary Judge
Supreme Court of Arizona
1501 West Washington Street, Suite 102
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
E-mail: officepdj@courts.az.gov

Copy of the foregoing mailed/emailed
this 17th day of December, 2021, to:

Carmen A. Chenal Horne Esq.
Carmen C. Horne Law Firm, PLLC
7272 E. Indian School Road, Suite 540
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251-3996
Email: carmenchenallaw@gmail.com
Respondent's Counsel

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th St., Suite 100
Phoenix, Arizona 85016-6266
Email: LRO@staff.azbar.org

by: Amy S. Ralston
KJF/asp

EXHIBIT A

Statement of Costs and Expenses

In the Matter of a Member of the State Bar of Arizona
David H. Stringer, Bar No. 019604, Respondent

File No(s). 20-1555

Administrative Expenses

The Supreme Court of Arizona has adopted a schedule of administrative expenses to be assessed in lawyer discipline. If the number of charges/complainants exceeds five, the assessment for the general administrative expenses shall increase by 20% for each additional charge/complainant where a violation is admitted or proven.

Factors considered in the administrative expense are time expended by staff bar counsel, paralegal, secretaries, typists, file clerks and messenger; and normal postage charges, telephone costs, office supplies and all similar factors generally attributed to office overhead. As a matter of course, administrative costs will increase based on the length of time it takes a matter to proceed through the adjudication process.

General Administrative Expenses for above-numbered proceedings

\$1,200.00

Additional costs incurred by the State Bar of Arizona in the processing of this disciplinary matter, and not included in administrative expenses, are itemized below.

Additional Costs

Total for additional costs \$ 0.00

TOTAL COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED **\$ 1,200.00**

EXHIBIT B

BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE

**IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER
OF THE STATE BAR OF
ARIZONA,**

**DAVID H. STRINGER,
Bar No. 019604,**

PDJ

**FINAL JUDGMENT AND
ORDER**

State Bar No. 20-1555

The Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona, having reviewed the Agreement for Discipline by Consent pursuant to Rule 57(a), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., accepts the parties' proposed agreement.

Accordingly:

IT IS ORDERED that Respondent, **David H. Stringer**, is **Reprimanded** for his conduct in violation of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, as outlined in the consent documents.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay the costs and expenses of the State Bar of Arizona in the amount of \$ 1,200.00, within 30 days from the date of service of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay the costs and expenses incurred by the disciplinary clerk and/or Presiding Disciplinary Judge's Office in connection with these disciplinary proceedings in the amount of _____, within 30 days from the date of service of this Order.

DATED this _____ day of December, 2021.

**Margaret H. Downie, Presiding Disciplinary
Judge**

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk of
the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge
of the Supreme Court of Arizona
this _____ day of December, 2021.

Copies of the foregoing mailed/emailed
this _____ day of December, 2021, to:

Carmen A. Chenal Horne
Carmen C. Horne Law Firm, PLLC
7272 E. Indian School Road, Suite 540
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251-3996
Email: carmenchenallaw@gmail.com
Respondent's Counsel

Copy of the foregoing emailed
this ____ day of December, 2021, to:

Kelly J. Flood
Staff Bar Counsel
State Bar of Arizona
4201 N. 24th Street, Suite 100
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by: _____