



**DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
AD HOC HEARING COMMITTEE**

In the Matter of

GLENDIA MONDESIR, ESQUIRE

Respondent,

**A Member of the Bar of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Bar Number: 465537
Date of Admission: December 10, 1999**

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: **Disciplinary Docket No. 2022-D025,**
: **2022-D069, 2022-D153 & 2025-D086**
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: **Board Docket Nos. 25-BD-059 &**
: **25-BD-069**
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**DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL’S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT’S
MOTIONS TO DISMISS**

On April 21, 2026, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Hearing Committee should recommend that this motion be denied.

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is procedurally improper. The Hearing Committee has no authority to dismiss the charges at this stage of the proceedings. Pursuant to Board Rule 7.16(a), the Hearing Committee cannot consider a respondent’s Motion to Dismiss until after the evidentiary hearing and, even then, can only propose a disposition, with its reasons, in its report and recommendation to the Board on Professional Responsibility. The Board Rule is consistent with the case law going back for decades. For example, in *In re Ontell*, 593 A.2d 1038 (D.C. 1991), the Court ruled that the hearing committee had acted properly in refusing to rule on respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court stated that it agreed with the Board’s ruling in another case, *In re Hyman*, DND 69-79 (BPR Apr. 10, 1981) at 10, that once Disciplinary Counsel has

made a decision to file formal charges, which must be approved by a Contact Member, only the Board or the Court has authority to dismiss the charges. “Introducing the practice of having Motions to Dismiss at the conclusion of the [Disciplinary] Counsel’s case not only adds a needless element of procedural complexity but also runs the risk of depriving this Board and/or the Court of a full record upon which to review the proceedings.” *Ontell*, 593 A.2d at 1040, quoting Board Report in *Hyman*. Similarly, in *In re Stanton*, 470 A.2d 281, 284-85 (D.C. 1983), the Board rejected respondent’s argument that the charges should have been dismissed before the hearing. The Board reiterated its ruling in *Hyman* that a Hearing Committee has no authority to dismiss charges but rather must recommend in its report to the Board what disposition should be made of any such motions filed by respondent. Substantively, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss fares no better.

Second, Disciplinary proceedings are governed by the D.C. Bar Rule XI and the Board Rules. Disciplinary Counsel’s Specification of Charges complies with those rules. This Hearing Committee has already ruled on a Motion for a Bill of Particulars filed by Respondent based on a claim that the Specification of Charges was not sufficient to defend the charges. This Committee, in its order dated January 22, 2026, stated that “Disciplinary Counsel’s allegations are sufficiently clear and specific to inform Respondent of the alleged misconduct and the disciplinary rule or rules alleged to have been violated, and thus comply with D.C. Bar R. XI, § 8(c); and Board Rule 7.1.” Order at page 5.

The Hearing Committee should recommend that this motion be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 27th day of April 2026, I emailed Disciplinary Counsel's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss to be emailed to the Board on Professional Responsibility at casemanager@dcbpr.org, and copies to be sent by first-class mail and email to Respondent's Counsel, Charles Burnham Esquire at 1634 I Street NW #575 Washington, DC 20006 and Charles@burnhamgorokhov.com.

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