Estates, Trusts and Probate Section Spring 2007 Newsletter

Estates, Trusts And Probate Law Section
Spring 2007 Newsletter

Greetings
2006-2007 Program Series
New Probate Rule 5.1 and Form 27
New Praecipes Confirming Attorney Address
Court Received Bar Input in Register of Wills Selection
Bench-Bar Conference
Probate Division to Relocate
Probate Practice Standards Promulgated
Guardianship Fund Rate Increase Initiative Committee
Recent Court Decisions
Comments, Notes And Announcements
Steering Committee

Greetings From The Steering Committee Co-Chairs

Judge José M. López, former presiding judge of the Probate Division, left the Division effective January 1, 2007. Judge A. Franklin Burgess, Jr. is the new presiding judge of the Probate Division and Judge Rhonda Reid Winston is the new deputy presiding judge.

Judge López accomplished much during his tenure, including but not limited to his outreach to the community, regularly scheduled Bench/Bar conferences and the development of probate practice standards, which have been approved by Chief Judge King. He has also worked tirelessly as chair of the Probate Education Committee, directed the development of new procedures that expanded the panel of examiners appointed in intervention cases and has guided efforts to increase the training of attorneys who serve on the fiduciary list. Judge López’s good humor and wit and his willingness to work together with the Bar have been greatly appreciated.

Plans for the Probate Division’s move to Building A are continuing. The move is currently expected to take place in June 2007. At that time, the Office of the Register of Wills will relocate to the 3rd floor of Building A, which is located at 515 Fifth Street, N.W., across the street from the main courthouse. The move will not be limited to the Register of Wills Office. Two courtrooms in Building A will be used by the Probate Division – one on the second floor and one on the third.

Reminder: As of January 2, 2007, yet another rule change impacting probate practice took effect. The new rule, SCR-PD 5.1, establishes privacy guidelines that are the responsibility of counsel and interested persons. Filings are now required to exclude personal identifiers, such as social security numbers, dates of birth and financial account numbers, except in limited circumstances. The change affects the reporting of financial accounts in accounts, inventories and conservatorship plans, making conforming amendments to SCR-PD 20, 109, 114, 204, 329, 330 409 and 414. A new probate form, Form 27, which will include complete account numbers, must be submitted as a separate filing. New rule SCR-PD 5.1 also states that it is the policy of the Court that parties not include home addresses and other private information in any court filings unless it is necessary to the matter being litigated or is otherwise expressly required by statute or other rules of the Court.

Anne Meister and Kim Turner,
Section Co-Chairs

2006-2007 Program Series

The Estates, Trusts and Probate Section offers a program series on timely topics at the D.C. Bar Conference Center, 250 H Street, NW, B-1 Level, from 12 noon– 1:45 pm. A light lunch is served. The remaining program in the 2006-2007 Series is:

District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia Update
Thursday, June 21, 2007

William E. Davis, Esq., Ross, Marsh & Foster (DC)
Charles S. Abell, Esq., Furey, Doolan & Abell, LLP (MD)
Virginia Speaker TBA
(Program Co-sponsored by the Taxation Section Estate Planning Committee)

If you have any suggested topics or speakers for next year’s Program Series, please contact Paul Pearlstein or Andrea Sloan.

New Probate Rule 5.1 and Form 27

As of January 2, 2007, in accordance with newly promulgated Probate Rule 5.1 regarding privacy requirements, certain personal identifying information must be excluded from filings. Attorneys and interested persons are required to comply with Rule 5.1, which applies to any filing in the Probate Division.

Probate Rule 5.1 balances public access to court records with the need for security against the identity theft and the inappropriate use of identifying information. Generally, Rule 5.1 requires the exclusion of Social Security, driver’s license, and financial account numbers from filings, other than testamentary writings. The acronyms “SSN” and “DOB” are to be used in place of the actual Social Security Number or date of birth. (Note that here are some exceptions to this rule, such as in Guardianships of Minors, which require birth dates.) Financial account numbers are no longer included in filings; rather, account numbers are reported on the new Form 27 and are filed under seal. Rule Promulgation Order 06-01 and SCR-PD Rule 5.1 are available below.

Rule Promulgation Order 06-01 and SCR-PD Rule 5.1
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New Praecipes to Confirm Attorney Address and for Trust Officers

The Register of Wills has two new praecipes available online of which you should be aware. If you have not done so already, please complete and submit the praecipe to confirm your current address to assist the Probate Division in its computer system conversion so that it may verify that it has your preferred mailing address on file. The praecipe to confirm your current address is available below.

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You need file only one copy of this praecipe and the address you provide will be applied to all of your pending matters in the Probate Division.

The second Praecipe relates to corporate fiduciaries seeking appointment as Personal Representative. The Register of Wills has instituted a policy that Letters of Administration may be issued to a corporate fiduciary without naming a specific Trust Officer, provided that a Trust Officer’s Praecipe is filed with the Petition for Probate. This Praecipe contains the contact information for the Trust Officer responsible for the administration of the given estate and for the CFO or President of the corporate fiduciary in the event that the Court is unable to reach the named Trust Officer.

Trust Officer’s Praecipe
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In the event the Trust Officer changes, a new Trust Officer’s Praecipe should be filed promptly with the court.

Court Received Bar Input in Register of Wills Selection

On invitation of Chief Judge Rufus G. King, III and Judge José M. López, presiding judge of the Probate Division, the Estates, Trusts and Probate Law Section was actively involved in the process of selecting the next Register of Wills.

In May 2006, the ETP Steering Committee was invited to recommend a committee of attorneys actively practicing in the probate division, with the task of reviewing applications submitted for the Register of Wills and submitting an advisory report to the committee of judges appointed to review and recommend a candidate to the Board of Judges. In August 2006, Chief Judge King accepted the recommendations of the steering committee and appointed the “Advisory Merit Selection Committee.” In forming the committee, Chief Judge King stated, “The advice and recommendation of the probate bar is an important part of completing a search and assessing candidates in support of the Judicial Committee in its selection process.”

The committee members were C. Hope Brown, Susan G. Blumenthal, Michael F. Curtin, Christopher G. Hoge, Archie L. Palmore, Paul D. Pearlstein, Kimberly Martin Turner, Shirley M. Williams, and Edward G. Varrone, who acted as coordinator for the committee’s efforts. The committee members were all attorneys who have extensive experience in the Probate Division, had previously been involved in Bar activities regarding the Probate Division, and reflected a broad cross-section of the Probate Bar.

The committee met several times in September and early October 2006, reviewed the applications of all applicants for the Register of Wills position, and interviewed each applicant. While the committee did not submit recommendations for or against a particular candidate, or rank the candidates in order of preference, the committee submitted an extensive report of its evaluation of each candidate. While keeping its review of applications, its deliberations, and its report confidential, as expected by the court, the committee members and the applicants, individual committee members did receive and report to the group comments and suggestions from members of the Probate Bar. “The Advisory Merit Selection Committee’s creation and work was an important and unique opportunity to contribute to the Court’s process,” commented Kimberly Turner, ETP Steering Committee Co-Chair.

Bench-Bar Conference

The next Bench-Bar Conference will be held on Tuesday, June 19th at 4:00 pm. Details will be forthcoming.

Probate Division to Relocate

The Probate Division will be relocating to the entire 3rd floor of Building A, 515 5th Street, NW, with its entrance facing 5th Street. The new space will include two courtrooms: one on the 2nd floor and the other on the 3rd floor. One of the courtrooms will have handicap access with a lifting witness stand. The independent bonding company of Pilzer & Gullickson will also maintain an office on the 3rd floor of the building. The move will require new telephone and fax numbers for the entire Division.

The new probate office will have only one public counter where all matters (decedents’ estates and interventions) will be handled. Probate clerks have cross-trained to handle all types of filings. To improve tracking of requests for copies, triple seals, etc., the Order Desk has implemented a new form that identifies the clerk who handled the request as well as the dates the request was processed or mailed.

Probate Practice Standards Promulgated

Chief Judge King approved the new Probate Practice Standards on December 5, 2006. The Probate Practice Standards are mandatory for attorneys appointed from the court’s fiduciary list and are strongly encouraged for all other probate practitioners.

The Superior Court’s Probate Education Committee developed the standards, eleven in all, with the objectives of establishing duties and responsibilities and to standardize practice in the Probate Division.

Practice Standards
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Guardianship Fund Rate Increase Initiative Committee

The Estates, Trusts and Probate Section Steering Committee created the Guardianship Fund Rate Increase Initiative Committee and charged it with the task of developing a strategy for pursuing an increase in the rate of compensation paid to counsel through the Superior Court’s Guardianship Fund. Compensation through the Guardianship Fund has remained at the same level for more than a decade.

The committee is chaired by Myrna Fawcett and includes Ray A. Johnson, Gilles A. E. Stucker, Jr., Bonnie Jones-Moon, Frances Hom, Steve Weinberg, C. Hope Brown, Vickey Wright-Smith, and Robert Gazzola.

Recent Court Decisions

Conservatorships:

In Re Estate of Audrey Booker, An Adult, INTVP 230-03 (J. Burgess, January 22, 2007).

At the time the Petitioner filed his first account, he did not file a petition for compensation for services performed during the first accounting period when the ward’s estate had sufficient assets to compensate him. Instead, Petitioner filed his petition for compensation for services performed during the first accounting period after his second and final account was filed and after the estate assets had been depleted so as to require any approved compensation to be paid from the Guardianship fund.

The Petitioner argued that he was excused from complying with SCR-PD 308(c)(1) by the Chief Judge’s Administrative Order 3-16, which was replaced by Administrative Order 4-07. At the time of the filing of the first account, Petitioner argued that he could not comply with the affidavit requirement of those Administrative Orders, an argument the Court found unpersuasive, pointing out that nothing in those Orders prevented the petitioner from filing his petition and explaining why he could not comply with the Order at the time of filing.

Compensation for services provided during the first accounting period was denied; compensation for the second account period was ordered paid from the Guardianship Fund.

In Re Estate of Joseph Tate, An Adult, INTVP 205-04 (J. Burgess, January 17, 2007).

The Conservator filed a Petition for Instructions Regarding a Statement of Claim filed against the Ward’s estate. The claimant had filed a claim pursuant to SCR-PD 307 for money owed from the estate as a result of the deceased ward’s borrowing money from him and taking his property while the claimant was imprisoned. The Ward died on July 3, 2006 and the conservator’s final account was approved on September 29, 2006. The funds remaining in the Ward’s estate, less the fees for the conservator, were deposited in the Registry of the Court pending appointment of a Personal Representative.

D.C. Code § 21-2075 provides the vehicle for terminating the conservatorship after the death of the ward. The Court held that the “expenses of administration” to be provided for in the order of termination includes conservator’s fees but do not include the ward’s debts. The claims of the claimant must be pursued against the decedent’s probate estate and as a creditor of the decedent, the claimant should be able to petition to open the estate and become personal representative. The claim was denied and the conservatorship was terminated.

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In Re Estate of Christopher Petroutsa, An Adult, INTVP 42-95 (J. López, November 2, 2006).

This matter was before the court on the Petition Post Appointment of the Limited General Guardian for an Emergency hearing on the issue of the removal of a ventilator. The Court ordered that the Guardian is authorized to make a decision to change the care of the ward to aggressive palliative care and to continue the Do Not Resuscitate Order. The Limited General Guardian’s authority includes authority to consent to discontinuation of mechanical ventilation and any other medical or surgical modalities not consistent with palliative care.

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In Re Estate of Sally A. Jumper, INTVP 184-02, DCCA Nos. 04-PR-1470 & 05-PR-338 (October 19, 2006).

The trial court concluded that the appellants, among other things: (1) improperly filed a petition to appoint a guardian and conservator of the subject despite the existence of estate planning documents of which they were or reasonably should have been aware; (2) failed to inform parties “whose participation was necessary for full and proper adjudication of the matter” that they had filed the petition; (3) “impaired the [trial court’s] access to critical information on which to base the [c]ourt’s judgment and Orders”; (4) asserted that the subject’s estate was in danger of being “wasted or dissipated” despite having no evidence to support this assertion; (5) filed the petition for improper purposes, including the hostility of one of the appellants toward the fiduciary of the subject’s trust; (6) acted in derogation of the Rules [of trial court] in seeking discovery of confidential information after the court vacated appellant’s appointment as [the subject’s] Guardian; and (7) met with the subject outside the presence of her attorney without notifying her attorney or advising the subject to consult her attorney, and convinced her to make changes to her estate plan that were favorable to one of the appellants.

The trial court assessed damages against appellants pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11. The Court of Appeals concluded that the moving parties failed to comply with the safe harbor provision of Rule 11 by not serving appellants with notice and permitting them a chance to withdraw or correct the challenged papers before presenting the motion to the court. This defect was fatal to the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and thus the trial court erred by ignoring the safe harbor requirement.

The Court of Appeals noted, however, that a court may act sua sponte to impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent authority even when it may not pursuant to the Rule 11 procedures. However, before a trial court can exercise its inherent authority to assess counsel fees as sanctions, a prerequisite find must be made that a party against whom the fees are assessed has acted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” The case was remanded for a finding as to whether appellants acted in bad faith so as to justify sanctions pursuant to the court’s inherent authority.

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Decedents’ Estates: In Re Estate Of Lillian Weeks, Deceased, Admin. No. 246-99, 135 DWLR 201 (December 21, 2006)

The decedent’s will left a parcel of her real property “in equal shares to be held as ‘joint tenants with right of survivorship’ to my children . . . , or the survivor(s). It is my desire that my son Cornelius B. Weeks be allowed to continue to live in one of the apartments in said building as long as he pays his share of the real property taxes, upkeep, and utilities.” (Emphasis supplied)

Cornelius Weeks contended that the will granted him a life estate free of any obligation to pay rent for his apartment; that he was responsible for only “his share”, i.e., one-fifth, of the real property taxes, utilities and maintenance expenses; and that against his share of those expenses he is entitled to credit or offset his one-fifth share of the rental income received from the other rental apartment in the building.

The Personal Representative of the estate denied that the Will granted Mr. Weeks a life estate and argued that the language in the will concerning the testatrix’s “desire” in that respect was merely precatory rather than mandatory. The parties agreed that the life estate issue turned upon whether the testatrix’s expressed “desire” in her Will that Mr. Weeks continue to live in one of the two apartments as long as he paid “his share” of relevant expenses, is mandatory or is precatory.

The Memorandum Opinion of the Court cited Davis v. Davis, 471 A.2d 1008 (D.C. 1984) which stated that “‘the general rule’ is that ‘when a wish is directed to legatees or devisees, the language may be seen as precatory; when the wish is directed to an executor, the language should be seen as mandatory. . . Further, language that refers to clearly-identified property should be seen as mandatory.” In this case, the first sentence of the relevant provision unequivocally and unconditionally devised the real property in equal shares to the testatrix’s surviving children as joint tenants with right of survivorship; the second sentence, expressing the desire that Mr. Weeks “be allowed” to continue living in one of the apartments, could only be addressed to the devisee joint tenants, not to an executor or Personal Representative, because only the joint owners could “allow” Mr. Weeks to live in the property. An executor or Personal Representative would have no authority to allow anyone to live in the apartment rent free or otherwise, once title was transferred form testatrix’s estate to the devisee joint tenants.

Another provision in the will demonstrated that the testatrix knew quite well how to devise a life estate in real property when she desired to do so. The Court found that the will granted Mr. Weeks a co-equal joint tenancy in the subject real property, not a life estate, which did not entitle him to occupy his apartment rent-free except with the consent of his joint co-tenants, and which obliges both him and each of his joint co-tenants to share equally in all expenses of the property and all income therefrom.

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In Re Estate of Leroy Green 135 DWLR 77 (December 21, 2006) (Judge Terry) (Hon. Kaye K. Christian, Trial Judge).

The subject of this appeal was the validity of a “side agreement” between the appellant, a successor Personal Representative, and seven of the decedent’s heirs. The decedent died on March 3, 1993, in the District of Columbia. The Trial Court entered judgment against appellant and his surety for $9,458.16 plus $1,702.47 in interest at 6% as well as costs incurred by appellee.

The court below concluded that the successor Personal Representative did not have a valid side agreement with the seven heirs for an additional fee and that his failure to turn over the financial records of the estate caused the estate to incur extra expenses. The Court of Appeals held that the side agreement was invalid because appellant, by entering into the agreement, breached his fiduciary to the heirs. The means appellant employed to bring about the side agreement did not further the best interests of the heirs.

When only $28,041.84 of the appellant’s $44,000 Request for Compensation was approved by the Court, appellant contacted decedent’s heirs (1) asking them if they would pay the difference between the fee he had requested and the fee approved by the Court; (2) informing them that he would appeal unless the matter was resolved; and (3) that no distributions would be made until the appeal was resolved. Six of the seventeen heirs agreed to the side agreement. The case was remanded to the trial court for recalculation of the pre-judgment interest only.

Affirmed in part and Remanded for further proceedings

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In Re Estate of Clarence Pechacek, Deceased, Admin. No. 949-05, (J. Burgess)(December 7, 2006).

This unsupervised administration proceeding came before the Court on the objections filed to the Account of the Unsupervised Personal Representative and the Petition to Review Compensation of the Personal Representative. The two central issues were: (1) did the personal representative breach his fiduciary obligations under the prudent person standard when he deposited estate funds, which were not subject to specific bequests or estate expenses, into a checking account; and (2) was his fee of $75,000 unreasonable under D. C. Code § 20-753.

The Will provided specific bequests to the objector and other nieces and nephews; the residuary estate was devised to a trust for the benefit of the decedent’s wife and sisters to whom all the income was to be distributed during their lifetimes and upon the death of the last to die, principal and accumulated income was to be distributed to the decedents nieces and nephews (one of whom was the objector).

The Court rejected the Personal Representative’s argument that since the interest income would have gone to the decedent’s widow or sisters (as the income beneficiaries of the trust) the objector was not injured by the personal representative’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty and thus had no standing to object. Before analyzing whether the personal representative violated the “prudent person” standard adopted by D.C. Code § 20-701(a), the Court made clear that the specific standards set forth in SCR-PD 5 and those contained in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, D. C. Code §§ 19-1309.01 - 1309-06, do not apply in this case. SCR-PD 5(a) (5) applies only to fiduciaries under the supervision of the court and the “prudent investor” standard found in D. C. Code §§ 19-1309.01 - 1309-06 apply only to trusts. As applied to a personal representative, the prudent person standard “ordinarily includes a duty to reasonably invest estate funds not needed to meet current estate claims and administrations expenses.

The duty to invest funds not reasonably needed to meet current claims, expenses, and specific legacies required the personal representative in the instant case, at a minimum, to place the excess funds in an interest-bearing account. The Court found that the Personal Representative fully satisfied this requirement when he placed all of the funds in that kind of account despite the objector’s argument that a prudent person would have placed the excess funds in higher yielding six-month US Treasury bills.

The Court next examined the objections to the Personal Representative’s $75,000 fee. The Personal Representative did not keep contemporaneous records showing the time he spent administering the estate; rather, he based his fee on a percentage commission, which he deemed reasonable (“4+%”). The Court looked at the post-hoc reconstruction of his hours and questioned the support for his assertion that he spent 320 hours on the administration of a relatively uncomplicated estate. Considering all the factors, the Court credited 50 hours of work at the rate of $300 per hour and approved a total fee of $15,000, reducing the compensation claimed by $60,000.

Somerville V. Randall 134 DWLR 2567 (September 28, 2006) (Judge Fisher) (Hon. Anna Blackburne-Rigsby, Trial Judge).

The appellants’ maternal great grandfather acquired the real property in question in 1949. He died intestate on July 12, 1979, survived by his Wife, from whom the appellants were not descended, and by a granddaughter who was the mother of the appellants. Upon the Wife’s death on December 3, 2001, her Will devised the real property the two devisees.

Appellants filed an action to quiet title, claiming an interest in the property through their mother. The trial court held that upon the decedent’s death, his property devolved by operation of law to his Wife and that therefore, the devise of the subject property by the Wife’s will upon her death yielded good title. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s decision failed to take account of appellants representations that the decedent was survived by a grandchild (their mother) as well as a spouse, and if such were the case, under the laws of intestacy applicable at the time of the decedent’s death, the granddaughter (appellants’ mother) would have inherited a share of the real property as well as the Wife.

The case was remanded for further inquiry and the trial court was directed to address the issues raised by the appellee’s arguments that the appellant’s claims are barred by the doctrines of laches and adverse possession.

Remanded.

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Trusts: Ackerman V. Ackerman Family Trust, et al., DCCA Nos. 05-CV-652 (October 12, 2006). (Judge Fisher) (Hon. Frederick H. Weisberg, Trial Judge).

The trust instrument, which was the subject of this litigation, contained the following provision:

“In the event that a beneficiary of any of the trust assets contests the validity of any provision of the “Settlor’s Will, any trusts which the Settlor or the Settlor’s spouse have created, or any transfers to this trust or the trust for the Settlor’s spouse, such beneficiary shall lose all of his or her right to any and all interests he or she may have from the Settlor’s Will and any trusts which the Settlor or the Settlor’s spouse have created. The person who has ‘contested’ shall be deemed to have predeceased me.”

The appellant, a beneficiary of the trust, filed a complaint which sought an accounting of the trust assets, income, liabilities, distributions, removal and replacement of the trustee and successor trustee; and reformation of the trust. The appellees asserted a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment determining whether the appellant had forfeited his rights as a beneficiary of the trust by filing his complaint. The trial court denied the relief requested in appellant’s complaint and held the “no contest clause” in the trust to be valid and enforceable.

The Court of Appeals observed that “[a]lthough no-contest clauses “appear most frequently in wills, there appears to be no reason to apply a different test [a no contest clause in a will is valid and will be enforced notwithstanding good faith and probable cause in making the contest] in determining the validity of such a clause in a living trust instrument. The Court held that the “no-contest” provision in the trust was valid and enforceable and that the appellant’s lawsuit to “reform” the trust clearly violated it.

Affirmed.

In Re Estate of Dion Baker, A Minor, TRP.No. 9-05 (J. Wertheim).

The Court disapproved payment of $17,264.18 (calculated as 1% of the trust assets) as compensation for the services of the Trustee of a special needs trust. The Trustee filed a Response asserting that compensation for his services was set by agreement of the parties at one percent (1%) of the trust corpus per year. The Court observed that there are no parties to a special needs trust in the conventional sense since the special needs trust was created by the Court under the Uniform Trust Act and therefore it is the Court rather than any “party” that determines whether the trustee’s compensation is “unreasonably low or high”. D.C. Code § 19-1307.08(b).

Furthermore, the compensation provision in the trust instrument provided that the trustee’s annual compensation “shall not exceed” one percent (1%) and listed eight factors to be considered in determining reasonableness of fees, including “the time devoted to trust duties” but not including any reference to percentage of trust corpus. The Court observed that the Trustee’s response offered no calculation or method of calculating any specific amount of compensation (except for the percentage measurement) and therefore the Court made a determination of reasonableness upon the information available and approved compensation in the amount of $8,400.00.

William E. Davis, Case Editor

NOTE: The Editor wishes to thank the Judges assigned to the Probate Division and Andrea Sloan, Esq. for making cases available for inclusion in this edition of Recent Court Decisions.

Comments, Notes And Announcements

Legislation Updates

District of Columbia Government Legislative Services provides status and effective dates of recent legislation. Information can be obtained by calling (202) 724-8050.

Pending legislation includes bills relating to a Domestic Partner’s right to claim partner’s dead body; right of Domestic Partners to hold real property as Tenants by the Entirety; and Uniform Prudent Management of Financial Funds Act of 2007.

Intervention and Elder Law Support Group

The Intervention and Elder Law Support Group meets from 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m in the Sixth Floor conference room at the D.C. Bar. This informal group meets several times a year to share information and to discuss legal and practical issues related to guardianship and conservatorship cases. Participants supply their own lunch and beverage. The final meeting date before the summer break will be June 15th.

Advice and Referral Clinic

Section members are encouraged to participate in the D.C. Bar Pro Bono Program’s Advice and Referral Clinics held on the second Saturday of each month from 9:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. at Bread for the City, 1525 Seventh Street, N.W. To volunteer, contact Mark Herzog with the D.C. Bar Pro Bono Program at (202) 737-4700, ext. 206.

Pilot Probate Resource Center at the Court Seeks Volunteers

The D.C. Bar Pro Bono Program seeks experienced probate attorneys to volunteer to staff the Probate Resource Center on the first Tuesday of the month. The Center will operate very much like the Advice and Referral Clinic that is held monthly at Bread for the City, but because of the expanded time, the D.C. Bar Pro Bono Program expects to be able to provide more thorough information and services. If you are interested in volunteering, please contact Margaret Duval, D.C. Bar Pro Bono Program Staff Attorney, at (202) 737-4700, ext. 297.

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Steering Committee

The Estates, Trusts and Probate Section Newsletter is produced up to four times a year and is available online at the Section’s webpage. The paper version is sent via third-class mail. The Newsletter always welcomes material on recent developments in District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia law.

Send newsletter materials to Catherine Mary Rafferty, Editor. Call or write with any suggestions you may have on the operation of the Section, programs, or this Newsletter.

For your convenience, Steering Committee and Standing Committee members are listed below:

Steering Committee Officers/Committee Assignments

Co-Chairs: Kimberly Martin Turner and Anne Meister
Secretary: Catherine Mary Rafferty
Programs Chair and Vice-Chair: Paul D. Pearlstein and Andrea Sloan
Financial Officer: Archie L. Palmore
Community Outreach Coordinator: Gilles Stucker
CLE Coordinator: Paul D. Pearlstein
Newsletter: Catherine Mary Rafferty
D.C. Digest: Anne Meister and Bill Davis
Probate: Andrea Sloan
Elder Law Chair and Vice-Chair: Morris Klein and Robert Bullock
Intervention and Elder Law Support Group: Archie L. Palmore
Legislation: Morris Klein
Internet Coordinator: Gilles Stucker
Nominating Committee Chair: Ed Varrone