Failure to Communicate
By Asma Naeem
Imagine, if you will, the latest novel by John Grisham, in which a
hardworking attorney (slated to be played by Tom Cruise in the movie
adaptation) who is climbing the ladder of success and partnership in
muggy Washington, D.C., suddenly finds out that he is being disciplined
by the Office of Bar Counsel for failing to communicate with his client
and not pursuing his case zealously and diligently. Not on the edge
of your seat?
The Office of Bar Counsel handles this kind of case every day. And
the discipline meted out for such violations is not inconsequential,
ranging from informal admonitions to suspensions from the practice of
law for 30 days or longer, for more egregious misconduct.
Diligence is not only what makes one lawyer better than another, but
also an ethical duty that encompasses one of the most fundamental responsibilities
of an attorney. Rule 1.3 of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct states
in pertinent part, “(a) A lawyer shall represent a client zealously
and diligently within the bounds of law. . . . (c) A lawyer shall act
with reasonable promptness in representing a client.”
Zealous representation does have its limits. As comment 1 to the rule
states, “a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that
might be realized for a client.”[1]
The Office of Bar Counsel, however, receives few complaints with
this type of allegation. Most of the cases that we consider involve
an attorney who has failed to do an essential task within the ambit
of the representation.
Take, for example, the recent case of In re Shepherd,[2]
in which the respondent was publicly censured and ordered to take a
course on professional responsibility for failing to appear at an initial
trial conference and failing to promptly communicate the status of the
case to his client.[3] Because the respondent failed to appear, the
case was dismissed; in fact, the respondent was not even aware of the
dismissal until over a year later.
In his defense, the respondent explained that he transferred the case
to another attorney, and that it was the other attorney who did not
attend the conference. However, the respondent failed to inform his
client that he transferred her case to a new attorney, failed to gain
her consent for the withdrawal, and failed to follow through with the
transfer in any adequate manner.
As we can see, the respondent’s lack of diligence revealed itself
in many forms, the most significant being that he failed to ensure that
the new attorney actually contacted the client, went to the pretrial
conference, and carried on with the representation.
Interestingly enough, even though the case was dismissed, the client
was not ultimately prejudiced because the statute of limitations had
been tolled while she was incarcerated. The fact that there was a lack
of substantial prejudice aside from delay, however, did not vitiate
the respondent’s violation of Rule 1.3.[4]
As In re Shepherd illustrates, sometimes lack of diligence and
lack of communication go hand in hand. This dyad of misconduct is not
surprising: if an attorney is not doing what he or she is supposed to
be doing in a case, the attorney will probably not want to let the client
know. We often see this stick-your-head-in-the-sand mentality at the
Office of Bar Counsel—a poor practice considering that communication
is one of the cornerstones of the legal profession and an important
facet of the fiduciary duty owed to the client. Indeed, lawyers are
required not only to respond to their clients’ inquiries, but
to initiate communication with them whenever necessary.[5]
Specifically, Rule 1.4 states:
As it turned out, the respondent’s efforts to hide one type of
misconduct (neglect) constituted another (lack of communication). When
faced with a situation like this, an attorney should be forthcoming
with the client, rather than risk running into bigger problems. We should
note as well that an attorney cannot shirk the responsibility of communicating
with the client by having someone else, lawyer or nonlawyer, do it for
the attorney.[9]
What can you do in your day-to-day practice to be ethically consistent
with Rules 1.3 and 1.4? The answer to this is simple: maintain a manageable
workload so that you can pay adequate attention to each and every one
of your cases, don’t procrastinate, and always talk to your client.
That way you can avoid hearing from some disciplinary tribunal what
was made famous by Strother Martin in the 1967 movie Cool Hand Luke:
“What we’ve got here is failure to communicate.”
Notes
[1] Representing a
client zealously also does not mean that an attorney needs to be aggressive
to the point of incivility when dealing with opposing counsel. See
D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3, cmt. 6.
[2] No. 03-BG-1343,
slip op. (D.C. Mar. 3, 2005).
[3] In addition to
violating Rules 1.3(a) and (c) and 1.4(a), the respondent was also found
to have violated Rules 1.16(d), for failing to protect his client’s
interests in a timely manner during termination of representation, and
8.4(d), for conduct interfering with the administration of justice.
[4] Bar Dkt. Nos. 313-98
& 83-99, Board on Prof’l Responsibility Rep. at 14 (Dec. 10,
2003); see In re Lewis, 689 A.2d 561 (D.C. 1997) (actual prejudice
not necessary element of the disciplinary violation).
[5] Comment 2 to Rule
1.4 states: “The lawyer must initiate and maintain the consultative
and decision-making process if the client does not do so and must ensure
that the ongoing process is thorough and complete.”
[6] 707 A.2d 371 (D.C.
1998).
[7] At the hearing
the respondent explained that he was suffering from a bevy of personal
problems, but waived the opportunity to present these as mitigating
factors. Id. at 376.
[8] Id. at 376–77.
[9]See In re Dreier, 671 A.2d
455 (D.C. 1996) (attorney’s reliance on third party for client
communication violated Rule 1.4).
Disciplinary Actions Taken by the Board on Professional Responsibility
Original Matters
In re Arthur J. Frank. Bar No. 419575. June 13, 2005. The majority of
the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends that the D.C. Court
of Appeals suspend Frank for six months. Frank engaged in negligent
misappropriation when he failed to maintain enough money in his client
trust accounts to satisfy his obligations. One member of the board dissented
and recommended that the matter be remanded to the hearing committee
for the receiving of additional evidence. Rule 1.15(a).
In re Donald L. Hoage. Bar No. 186551. July 29, 2005. The Board on
Professional Responsibility recommends that the D.C. Court of Appeals
disbar Hoage and condition his reinstatement upon his disgorging his
fees of $48,000, with interest calculated at 6 percent per annum from
June 20, 2001, to the D.C. Bar Clients’ Security Fund. Hoage,
while serving as a personal representative to an estate, failed to provide
competent representation; failed to serve a client with skill and care;
engaged in reckless misappropriation; failed to promptly deliver funds
belonging to a client; engaged in conduct involving dishonesty; and
seriously interfered with the administration of justice. Rules 1.1(a),
1.1(b), 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).
In re Celicia Hoover-Hankerson. Bar No. 438086. July 26, 2005. The
Board on Professional Responsibility recommends that the D.C. Court
of Appeals disbar Hoover-Hankerson. Hoover-Hankerson was convicted in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia of one count of
conspiracy to defraud the United States and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2; two counts of fraud in
the first degree and aiding and abetting, in violation of D.C. Code
§§ 22-3221(a), 22-3222(a)(1), and 22-1805 (2001); and two
counts of theft concerning federally funded programs and aiding and
abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(1)(A) and 2.
The board concluded that because two of the crimes for which Hoover-Hankerson
was convicted (fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United States) involved
moral turpitude per se, disbarment is mandatory.
In Francisco A. Laguna. Bar No. 414894. July 26, 2005. The Board on
Professional Responsibility recommends that the D.C. Court of Appeals
deny Laguna’s petition for reinstatement.
In re Maria C. Mendoza. Bar No. 430906. July 27, 2005. The Board on
Professional Responsibility recommends that the D.C. Court of Appeals
suspend Mendoza for 90 days. Mendoza engaged in dishonesty, deceit,
and misrepresentation with respect to a factoring agreement for Criminal
Justice Act (CJA) vouchers that she entered into with another party.
Mendoza submitted at least 27 false CJA vouchers, with the intent to
mislead the other party into believing that the vouchers had been submitted
to the court, in order to obtain advance funds on cases that had not
been completed. Rule 8.4(c).
In re Randy M. Mott. Bar No. 211037. July 28, 2005. Pursuant to an
order of remand, issued sua sponte by the D.C. Court of Appeals to reconsider
the issue of sanction, the Board on Professional Responsibility affirms
its prior recommendation that the D.C. Court of Appeals publicly censure
Mott. Mott failed to safe-keep property and maintain records, failed
to keep trust funds in a trust account, and failed to keep and maintain
records. Rules 1.15(a) and 1.17(a) and D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(f).
In re James S. Powell. Bar No. 427084. July 27, 2005. The Board on
Professional Responsibility recommends that the D.C. Court of Appeals
suspend Powell for one year with fitness. Powell made false statements
of material fact on his application for admission to the bar of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Rules 8.1(a), 8.4(c),
and 8.4(d).
In re Robert L. Rehberger. Bar No. 393234. July 27, 2005. The Board
on Professional Responsibility recommends that the D.C. Court of Appeals
disbar Rehberger. Rehberger was convicted in Georgia state court for
criminal offenses of false imprisonment, sexual battery, and simple
battery, involving moral turpitude on the facts. Rules 1.7(b)(4) and
8.4(b).
In re Michael A. Romansky. Bar No. 942169. June 24, 2005. Upon remand
from the D.C. Court of Appeals, the Board on Professional Responsibility
found insufficient evidence to conclude that Romansky’s conduct
with respect to two clients violated Rule 8.4(c). The board affirmed
its recommendation that the court suspend Romansky for 30 days based
on dishonesty in connection with billing practices for another client
and also in connection with a purported client letter of recommendation
he submitted to his firm. Rule 8.4(c).
In re Salvatore Scanio. Bar No. 435343. July 29, 2005. The Board on
Professional Responsibility recommends that the D.C. Court of Appeals
publicly censure Scanio. Scanio, while pursuing his own personal injury
claim arising out of an automobile accident, engaged in conduct involving
dishonesty when he made a claim to his insurance provider for lost income
and lost bonus, and subsequently when he falsely told his firm that
he had explained to his insurance provider that he had not lost any
income. One member of the board dissented with regard to sanction, recommending
that Scanio be suspended for 60 days. Rule 8.4(c).
In re Lloyd Ukwu. Bar No. 420617. July 29, 2005. The Board on Professional
Responsibility recommends that, in connection with five client matters,
the D.C. Court of Appeals suspend Ukwu for one year, with reinstatement
conditioned upon fitness and restitution to three of the five clients
(the other two were pro bono representations), with interest of 6 percent
per annum from the date of each client’s payment. The board concluded
that, while representing five foreign nationals over a four-year period,
Ukwu failed to provide adequate representation in all matters. It further
concluded that Ukwu also engaged in the serious interference with the
administration of justice in three matters and that he acted dishonestly,
intentionally abandoned a client, and made misrepresentations to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Board of Immigration
Appeals in one matter. Rules 1.1(a), 1.1(b), 1.3(a), 1.3(b)(1), 1.3(b)(2),
1.3(c), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).
In re Sheron J. Walters. Bar No. 464655. July 22, 2005. The Board on
Professional Responsibility recommends that the D.C. Court of Appeals
disbar Walters by consent.
In re Donald W. Whitehead. Bar No. 431037. July 29, 2005. The Board
on Professional Responsibility recommends that the D.C. Court of Appeals
suspend Whitehead for 60 days, with the suspension stayed in favor of
two years’ probation, during which time he be required to comply
with five specified conditions. Whitehead failed to serve a client with
skill and care; failed to act diligently and zealously represent a client;
failed to act with reasonable promptness in representing a client; failed,
in the context of termination of his representation, to take timely
steps to protect a client’s interest (such as surrendering property
to which the client was entitled to court-appointed successor counsel);
and engaged in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration
of justice, in each of four separate client representations. In addition,
in two of the representations Whitehead failed to keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information. Rules 1.1(b), 1.3(a), 1.3(c), 1.4(a) 1.16(d),
and 8.4(d).
Reciprocal Matters
In re Steven M. Angel. Bar No. 405417. June 3, 2005. In two consolidated
reciprocal matters from Oklahoma, the Board on Professional Responsibility
recommends that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose reciprocal discipline
and suspend Angel for five years with fitness. In the first reciprocal
matter the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued Angel a public reprimand. Thereafter,
with 13 disciplinary grievances pending against him, Angel was allowed
to resign his membership in the Oklahoma Bar Association provided he
reimburse the client security fund for any money disbursed because of
his conduct. The resignation prohibited him from applying for reinstatement
before the lapse of five years. The grievances alleged that Angel neglected
or failed to communicate with his clients, failed to respond to the
grievance as required by Rule 5.2 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional
Conduct, failed to return unearned portions of his fee, and in three
matters failed to provide competent service to his client.
In re Mary D. Brennan. Bar No. 460962. July 28, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Maryland, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose an identical sanction consisting
of a 90-day suspension, nunc pro tunc, to March 9, 2004. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland suspended Brennan for 90 days by consent for failing
to file income tax returns, misconduct with respect to her attorney
escrow account, and the unauthorized practice of law during a period
of decertification.
In re Timothy Brown. Bar No. 366743. June 10, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Maryland, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose substantially different reciprocal
discipline and suspend Brown for 30 days, with reinstatement conditioned
on his compliance with the restitution requirement imposed in Maryland.
The 30-day suspension is to run from March 16, 1994. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland indefinitely suspended Brown pursuant to a joint petition
subject to conditions of reinstatement. Brown, while retained to represent
a client in a criminal matter, charged an unreasonable fee, failed to
keep a client’s fee advance and his own property separate, and
upon termination of representation failed to return an unearned fee
to his former client. In addition, Brown failed to respond to a lawful
demand for information from a disciplinary authority.
In re Louis J. De Maio. Bar No. 151035. June 14, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Maryland, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose nonidentical reciprocal discipline
and suspend De Maio for 18 months with fitness. The Maryland Court of
Appeals disbarred De Maio for making “false, spurious and inflammatory
representations and allegations” against the chief judge and clerk
of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in various court filings.
In addition, the Maryland court found that De Maio failed to cooperate
with a Maryland Bar Counsel investigation into his conduct.
In re Timothy A. Dewitt. Bar No. 432651. July 15, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from California, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose identical reciprocal discipline
and suspend DeWitt for 60 days and stay the execution of the suspension
in favor of an 18-month period of probation, subject to the terms and
conditions of probation imposed by the California court. The hearing
department of the California State Bar court approved a stipulation
between the state bar and DeWitt agreeing to a set of facts establishing
DeWitt’s violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(c). DeWitt
stipulated that he caused to be printed what appeared to be valid parking
citations, without legal authority, designed to look authentic. DeWitt
issued approximately 35 of these citations in various California jurisdictions
and received payment from three of the citation recipients, ultimately
making restitution, with interest, to the one citizen from whom he collected
payment.
In re Phillip Timothy Howard. Bar No. 457694. June 2, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Florida, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose functional identical discipline
and publicly censure Howard. The Supreme Court of Florida reprimanded
Howard based on a conditional consent judgment in which Howard admitted
there was a factual basis to find he violated Rule 8.4(c), for conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Howard, on
behalf of his law firm, was a signatory to a contract between the state
of Florida and a group of 12 independent law firms. Believing he had
authority to do so, Howard signed that names of certain of his cocounsel
to a document without noting on the document that he was executing it
on their behalf.
In re Wayne A. Hagendorf. Bar No. 430695. June 23, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Nevada, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose identical reciprocal discipline
and suspend Hagendorf for five months, with all but 60 days stayed.
The Supreme Court of Nevada suspended Hagendorf for five months, with
all but 60 days stayed, on condition that he pay restitution of $25,000
and costs not to exceed $1,000. Hagendorf’s suspension by the
Nevada court was based on an agreement for violating Nevada disciplinary
rules pertaining to candor toward the tribunal; relations with opposing
counsel; truthfulness in statements to others; dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation; and conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice, while representing himself in civil litigation against a
former landlord.
In re Paul B. Klein. Bar No. 391816. June 2, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Maryland, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose functionally identical discipline
and publicly censure Klein. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reprimanded
Klein by consent based on stipulated violations of inadequate communication
relating to a single client and arising out of Klein’s referral
of a client’s personal injury case to another attorney without
adequately informing the client that he would terminate his involvement
in the case.
In re Robert D. Klock. Bar No. 282822. June 13, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Arkansas, the Board on Professional Responsibility issued
Klock a board reprimand. The Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Conduct issued Klock a “public caution” for engaging in
ineffective assistance and performance while representing a client in
a criminal matter.
In re Antoine I. Mann. Bar No. 433378. July 18, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Maryland, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose identical reciprocal discipline
and indefinitely suspend Mann. The Court of Appeals of Maryland indefinitely
suspended Mann by consent owing to his “psychological and/or psychotic
problems that cannot be diagnosed at this time due to [his] abuse of
alcohol.” In his consent Mann acknowledged that if a hearing were
to be held, sufficient evidence could be produced to sustain the allegations
of misconduct in eight separate complaints over a four-year period.
Mann also consented to pay $6,474.85 to reimburse the Maryland Attorney
Grievance Commission for costs incurred in its investigation.
In re James R. Marlen. Bar No. 458330. July 28, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Texas, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose identical reciprocal discipline
and suspend Marlen for two years, with the suspension stayed in favor
of two years’ probation, subject to the conditions imposed in
Texas. The Texas Grievance Committee found that Marlen had failed to
provide competent and diligent representation, failed to communicate
with a client, failed to safe-keep property, and failed to respond to
a disciplinary authority.
In re Michael J. Miller. Bar No. 397689. July 20, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Maryland, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose functionally identical discipline
and publicly censure Miller. The Court of Appeals of Maryland publicly
reprimanded Miller by consent for engaging in the unauthorized practice
of law in Mississippi.
In re Agostinho D. Reis. Bar No. 304436. June 7, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from New York, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose identical reciprocal discipline
and disbar Reis. The Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York,
First Judicial Department, disbarred Reis on the grounds that he had
neither appeared nor applied in writing to the disciplinary committee
or the court for a hearing or reinstatement of a suspension order. Reis
was suspended for failure to cooperate with the disciplinary committee’s
investigation and uncontested evidence of his professional misconduct.
In re Albert S. Watkins. Bar No. 399625. July 19, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Missouri, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends
that the D.C. Court of Appeals impose functionally identical reciprocal
discipline and publicly censure Watkins. The Supreme Court of Missouri
publicly reprimanded Watkins based on a stipulation of facts and joint
recommendation for discipline. Watkins revealed information relating
to the representation of a client without the client’s consent
after consultation and engaged in a conflict of interest, in that his
representation of one client was materially limited by his responsibilities
to another client.
Disciplinary Actions Taken by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals
Original Matters
In re Michael O. Burnett. Bar No. 430523. July 21, 2005. The D.C. Court
of Appeals suspended Burnett for 30 days, with reinstatement conditioned
on Burnett’s responding to Bar Counsel’s inquiries and fitness.
Burnett failed to respond or cooperate with Bar Counsel in the investigation
of three disciplinary complaints that were filed against him in 2001
and 2002.
In re Mark M. Hager. Bar No. 418262. July 14, 2005. The D.C. Court
of Appeals granted Hager’s petition for reinstatement, conditioned
upon (1) his disgorgement to the D.C. Bar Clients’ Security Fund
of $57,068 (this being the full amount of his attorney’s fees
received in the matter leading to his suspension, minus expenses and
taxes paid), plus interest calculated at the legal rate of 6 percent,
such entire amount having heretofore been placed into an escrow account
established by Hager; (2) his agreement that he will turn over to that
fund any tax benefits he might realize as a consequence of that disgorgement;
and (3) his satisfactory completion of a continuing legal education
course on professional responsibility.
In re Adrian P. Ifill. Bar No. 192864. June 16, 2005. In two consolidated
disciplinary proceedings, one an original matter and the other a reciprocal
matter from Maryland, the D.C. Court of Appeals imposed two separate
sanctions. With regard to the original matter, the court suspended Ifill
for one year, with full restitution in the amount of $10,000 with interest
at the legal rate beginning no later that November 9, 1995, as a condition
of restitution. The original matter, which was also part of the reciprocal
matter, involved a client’s potential claims against insurance
companies whereby Ifill failed to provide competent representation,
failed to perform substantive work, failed to communicate, failed to
communicate the rate or basis of the fee in writing, charged an excessive
fee, made misrepresentations to the client, and made false statements
of material fact to D.C. Bar Counsel, which he repeated in the Maryland
disciplinary matter. With regard to the reciprocal matter, the D.C.
Court of Appeals imposed identical reciprocal discipline and disbarred
Ifill. The reciprocal matter involved an estate matter in which Ifill
misappropriated entrusted funds, took a fee for work on the estate without
prior approval of the Maryland Orphans’ Court, and gave false
statements and testimony to cover up the
misappropriations.
In re Robert P. Kaufman. Bar No. 375715. June 30, 2005. The D.C. Court
of Appeals publicly censured Kaufman. Kaufman failed to cooperate with
Bar Counsel’s investigation and failed to comply with a board
order compelling a response. Kaufman appeared and participated before
a hearing committee in the matter. Rules 8.1(b) and 8.4(d) and D.C.
Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3).
In re Jacqueline C. Morris-Goodson. Bar No. 281998. July 7, 2005. The
D.C. Court Appeals indefinitely suspended Morris-Goodson based on disability.
In re Gerald H. Parshall Jr. Bar No. 396877. July 21, 2005. The D.C.
Court of Appeals suspended Parshall for 18 months. Parshall, in his
capacity as a trial lawyer employed by the tax division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, on at least one occasion, intentionally misled
a U.S. district court by his filing of a false status report that also
included attached documents he had fabricated in order to support his
fraudulent report.
In re Billy L. Ponds. Bar No. 379883. June 9, 2005. The D.C. Court
of Appeals publicly censured Ponds. Ponds improperly disclosed confidential
information in a motion to withdraw as defense counsel in Maryland.
Maryland Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 (made applicable by D.C.
Rule 8.5(b)(1) (choice of law)).
In re Andrew M. Steinberg. Bar No. 350983. July 7, 2005. The D.C. Court
of Appeals suspended Steinberg for 60 days, with reinstatement conditioned
on making restitution to the client in the amount of $750 plus interest
at 6 percent annum, and further ordered that the 60-day suspension run
consecutive to Steinberg’s suspension and requirement that he
demonstrate fitness to practice law that was the sanction in another
matter. Steinberg failed to provide competent representation; failed
to represent a client with the skill and care of similarly situated
practitioners; failed to adhere to the objectives of his client; failed
to represent a client with diligence and zeal; failed to represent a
client with reasonable promptness; and failed to communicate with a
client. Rules 1.1(a), 1.1(b), 1.2(a), 1.3(a), 1.3(c), and 1.4(a).
In re Gerald S. Susman. Bar No. 12799. June 9, 2005. The D.C. Court
of Appeals disbarred Susman. Susman pleaded guilty in 1997 to the felony
offense of making false statements in relation to documents required
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(c).
In re John W. Thyden. Bar No. 179879. June 16, 2005. The D.C. Court
of Appeals suspended Thyden for 30 days. In connection with a bankruptcy
matter, Thyden undertook representation of one client, a creditor to
the bankruptcy petitioner, for the purpose of advancing the interests
of other creditors; disregarded the interests of the client; failed
to communicate with the client or to inform the client of a potential
settlement offer; filed inappropriate pleadings that delayed the bankruptcy
proceeding; and prejudiced the client by subjecting him to sanctions.
Rules 1.4(a)–(c) and 8.4(d).
In re George E. Tillerson III. Bar No. 446661. June 16, 2005. The D.C.
Court of Appeals disbarred Tillerson. Tillerson was convicted in the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia of first-degree theft, in
violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-3211 and 22-3211(a) (2001), a
crime that involved moral turpitude per se, for which disbarment is
mandatory.
Reciprocal Matters
In re Phillip T. Howard. Bar No. 457694. July 21, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Florida, the D.C. Court of Appeals imposed identical reciprocal
discipline and publicly censured Howard. The Supreme Court of Florida
publicly reprimanded Howard for conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation. Howard executed a conditional consent
judgment in which he admitted that in 1995, believing that he had the
authority to do so, he signed the names of some of his cocounsel to
a document without noting in every instance that he was executing the
document on their behalf.
In re Thomas O’Toole. Bar No. 419140. June 23, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from Maryland, the D.C. Court of Appeals imposed identical reciprocal
discipline and suspended O’Toole for 30 days. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland suspended O’Toole for 30 days, finding that he willfully
failed to file his own individual federal and state income tax return
forms over the course of three years, from 1998 to 2001, although he
had made substantial estimated tax payments.
In re Denis L. Ventriglia. Bar No. 370938. June 30, 2005. In a reciprocal
matter from North Carolina, the D.C. Court of Appeals imposed identical
reciprocal discipline and suspended Ventriglia for two years, with the
suspension stayed in favor of two years of unsupervised probation nunc
pro tunc to December 29, 2003. Ventriglia failed to file and pay federal
and state income tax returns for 1997, 1998, and 1999, and to pay self-employment
tax from 1997 to 2000.
Informal Admonitions Issued by the Office of Bar Counsel
In re Leroy T. Jenkins. Bar No. 414080. June 16, 2005. Bar Counsel issued
Jenkins an informal admonition for failing to file timely proof of service
on the defendants in a civil case and failing to file timely and appropriate
motions to reinstate the case. Rules 1.1(a) and 1.3(c).
The Office of Bar Counsel compiled the foregoing summaries of disciplinary
actions. Please note that in some cases Bar members may have the same
name. To confirm the identity of individuals who have been subject to
discipline, contact the D.C. Bar Member Service Center at 202-626-3475
or
membership@dcbar.org.
.
