Legal Spectator
How Could Someone As Smart As You Do Something So Unwise?
By Jacob A. Stein
I happened to be present when a federal judge gave advice to a group
of newly appointed federal judges. He said they would receive letters
from people who have matters before the court. What does a judge do
with such a letter? Should it be kept in the judge’s chambers,
or should it be filed with the Office of the Clerk of the court?
The judge then said he would like to read a letter he just received.
Dear Judge:
I will be in your court next Wednesday when you will
impose sentence on me. But for the grace of God, Judge, I would be sitting
where you are, and you would be standing before me as a defendant to
be sentenced. If that were so, I assure you I would put you on probation.
But for the grace of God. This is a consideration to ponder. This
came to mind as I listened to a client disclosing that he had done something
wrong and self-destructive. It was completely out of character. He was
wise, helped people along the way, and had a fine reputation. Nothing
in his prior life could explain the blunder he committed.
I was tempted to say, “How could you, with all your experience
and as smart as you are, do something so unwise?” The truth of
the matter is that there is no real answer to the question. It may take
years to understand why we do the foolish things we do.
Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) was interested in receiving
answers to such questions. Although he was a bookish man, he became
mayor of Bordeaux, France, near his hometown. He also traveled widely
through Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. Montaigne
had served in the army during the French Wars of Religion where he conducted
public affairs as a mediator in an effort to resolve the conflicts.
He had carried out missions for royalty and had seen the world such
as it was during his various roles. He also had studied law and served
13 years as a judge.
In 1571 he took leave of his judgeship and other activities, returning
to private life to conduct “a dialogue of the mind with itself.”
As a judge, he pondered the but-for-the-grace-of-God issue and why someone
would do something self-destructive despite his good character. He also
made findings of guilt and imposed sentences—the law required it—otherwise,
there would be anarchy. Nevertheless, the question remained. This personal
concern of his was a factor in his decision to seek isolation and look
within. He wanted to gain insight as to why he did things he later regretted.
He saw how people (and of course himself) slide into a trap by degrees.
He sought isolation in his library where he generated a writing he called
his Essays. In it, he covered several troublesome topics such as
fear, idleness, lying, and sadness.
In one chapter, “Of the Inconstancy of Our Actions,” he
writes that our contradictions are such that we imagine we have two
souls that “accompany and incline us, the one towards good and
the other towards ill, according to their own nature and propension;
so abrupt a variety not being imaginable to flow from one and the same
source.”
Let me give a personal aside on that subject of two souls. I, as Montaigne,
have two souls. As a lawyer, I hear people’s troubles. I want
to defend them, to justify what they did, if I can. There is another
soul questioning the validity of the defense and the role a lawyer plays.
It is mischievous. It hides books and files. It makes me forget appointments
with people I don’t particularly like. It appears in dreams, unpleasant
dreams. It hides the lists that I make to foil it.
And now, back to Montaigne:
Not only do chance winds sway me according to their direction, but
I am also swayed and confused by the instability of my footing; and
he who closely observes about this finds himself scarcely twice in the
same state. I give to my soul sometimes one point of view, sometimes
another, according to the side to which I turn her. If I speak diversely
about myself, it is because I see myself diversely. All contradictions
exist in me at some moment and in some fashion. Shamefaced, insolent;
chaste, licentious; talkative, taciturn; hardy, effeminate; sharp-witted,
stupid; ill-humoured, courteous; a liar, truthful; learned, ignorant;
and open-handed and avaricious and prodigal—all these things I
see in myself in some degree, according as I turn myself about; and
whoever studies himself very carefully finds in himself, aye, and in
his very judgement, this same volubility and discordance….
Montaigne had the nerve, or is it the courage, to tell the truth.
I have seen no monster or miracle on earth more evident than myself;
we become wonted to all strangeness by habit and time; but the more
familiar I am with myself and the better I know myself, the more my
misshapenness astonishes me, and the less do I comprehend myself.
The Essays have never been out of print. Shakespeare and others
have incorporated Montaigne into their own writings. If you read a few
pages each day, he will become your friend; in fact, his essay on friendship
is a starting point. Asked to explain why someone so different from himself,
and with no apparent charms, was his closest friend, he summed up the
perfect friendship this way: “Because it was he, because it was
myself.”
Reach Jacob A. Stein at jstein@steinmitchell.com.
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