(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice;
(e) State or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official;
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable Rules of Judicial Conduct or other law; or
(g) Seek or threaten to seek criminal charges or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.
Comment
[1] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely
on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the
offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some
kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction
was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude."
That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters
of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that
have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although
a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer
should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate
lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving
violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with
the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated
offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately,
can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
[2] Paragraph (d)’s prohibition of conduct that "seriously
interferes with the administration of justice" includes conduct
proscribed by the previous Code of Professional Responsibility under
DR 1-102(A)(5) as "prejudicial to the administration of justice."
The extensive case law on that standard, as set forth below, is hereby
incorporated into this Rule.
[3] The majority of these cases involve a lawyer’s
failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel. A lawyer’s failure to respond
to Bar Counsel’s inquiries or subpoenas may constitute misconduct, see
In re Cope, 455 A.2d 1357 (D.C. 1983); In re Haupt, 444 A.2d
317 (D.C. 1982); In re Lieber, 442 A.2d 153 (D.C. 1982); In
re Whitlock, 441 A.2d 989 (D.C. 1982); In re Spencer, No.
M-112-82 (D.C. June 4, 1982); In re L. Smith, No. M-91-82 (D.C.
App. Mar. 9, 1982); In re Walsh, No. M-70 (81) (D.C. Sept. 25,
1981) en banc; In re Schattman, No. M-63-81 (D.C. June
2, 1981); In re Russell, 424 A.2d 1087 (D.C. 1980); In re
Willcher, 404 A.2d 185 (D.C. 1979); In re Carter, No. D-31-79
(D.C. Oct. 28, 1979); In re Bush (Bush II), No. S-58-79 (D.C.
Oct. 1, 1979); In re Tucker, No. M-13-75/S-56-78 (D.C. Nov. 15,
1978), as may the failure to abide by agreements made with Bar Counsel.
In re Harmon, M-79-81 (D.C. Dec. 14, 1981) (breaking promise
to Bar Counsel to offer complainant refund of fee or vigorous representation
constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
[4] A lawyer’s failure to appear in court for a scheduled
hearing is another common form of conduct deemed prejudicial to the
administration of justice. See In re Evans, No. M-126-82 (D.C.
Dec. 18, 1982); In re Doud, Bar Docket No. 442-80 (Sept. 23,
1982); In re Bush (Bush III), No. S-58-79/D/39/80 (D.C. Apr.
30, 1980); In re Molovinsky, No. M-31-79 (D.C. Aug. 23, 1979).
Similarly, failure to obey court orders may constitute misconduct under
paragraph (d). Whitlock, 441 A.2d at 989-91; In re Brown,
Bar Docket No. 222-78 (Aug. 4, 1978); In re Bush (Bush I), No.
DP-22-75 (D.C. July 26, 1977).
[5] While the above categories—failure to cooperate
with Bar Counsel and failure to obey court orders—encompass the
major forms of misconduct proscribed by paragraph (d), that provision
is to be interpreted flexibly and includes any improper behavior of
an analogous nature. For example, the failure to turn over the assets
of a conservatorship to the court or to the successor conservator has
been held to be conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice."
In re Burka, 423 A.2d 181 (D.C. 1980). In Russell, supra,
the court found that failure to keep the Bar advised of respondent’s
changes of address, after being warned to do so, was also misconduct
under that standard. And in Schattman, supra, it was held that
a lawyer’s giving a worthless check in settlement of a claim against
the lawyer by a client was improper.
