Opinion 264
* [NOTE: See how Opinion 264 has been substantively affected by the amendments to the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct that became effective on February 1, 2007]
Refunds of Special Retainers; Commingling of Such Funds with the
General Funds of the Law Firm Upon Receipt
A retainer that is tied directly to provision of legal services, rather
than designed solely to ensure availability, constitutes a special retainer
which is earned upon provision of the contemplated services rather than
upon receipt. A law firm must refund unused portions of such a retainer.
Under the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, a special
retainer or fee advance becomes the property of the law firm upon receipt;
may be commingled with the law firm’s own funds; and must not be commingled
with client funds in a client trust account. Such an arrangement must
not prevent an accounting to the client or a refund if required.
Applicable Rules
Inquiry
The Inquirer is a law firm that wishes to place into effect a legal
services plan in the government contract field for small business concerns.
As explained by the Inquirer, “companies desiring to enroll in
the [Plan] would pay a fixed fee of $4,500 for up to 40 hours of government
contract legal services during the ensuing year. (There is also a one-time
20 hour, six-month trial plan for $2,500.) Except where conflicts arise
subsequent to enrollment and no waiver is received, the enrollment fee
would not be refundable.” The Inquirer states that the hourly fee
under the plan (assuming full utilization of the contemplated hours)
is substantially lower than its normal hourly rates. Enrollment in the
plan would be contractual, pursuant to a written agreement containing
the following terms:
For a one-year period of enrollment, [Inquirer] will provide
up to 40 hours of legal services to the Company on any federal government
contract matter(s). For the six-month trial period of enrollment, [Inquirer]
will provide up to 20 hours of legal services, to the Company on any
federal government contract matter(s). These hours of legal services
may include any combination of legal consultation (by telephone or in
[Inquirer’s] Washington, D.C. office), legal research, or drafting and
filing of documents. . . .
If the Company requires services beyond the
number of hours covered by the Plan, such services will be performed
by [Inquirer] only with the advance written consent of the Company,
and will be billed to the Company at [Inquirer’s] regular hourly rates,
plus all out-of-pocket expenses.
Because the enrollment fee for the Plan is
a retainer to ensure the availability of [Inquirer’s] government contracts
legal services, the fee is not refundable in whole or in part if the
Company requests fewer than the applicable hours of legal services during
the enrollment period (40 hours for one year of enrollment, 20 hours
for a six-month trial period).
The Inquirer has asked for advice on two aspects of this plan:
- Can the enrollment fee be nonrefundable?
- If such a fee must be refundable, must it be segregated and treated
as funds of the client?
Discussion
A. Refundability
The refundability issue turns on whether the contemplated arrangement
constitutes a special retainer, which is a species of fee advance, or
a general retainer. A general (or “true”) retainer is a “fee[]
paid solely for availability and therefore do[es] not involve an advance
fee but a fee that is fully earned when paid.”1
In many jurisdictions, a general retainer is deemed earned when paid
and therefore is not refundable.2
The traditional justification for a general retainer is that the fee
secures the lawyer’s availability to perform legal services during a
specified period, a commitment that normally requires the lawyer to
forego other representations and commit exclusively to the cause of
the retaining client.3
A general retainer is paid solely for availability and a promise of
exclusivity, and is not related to time expended on a particular matter.
By contrast, a “special” retainer is an advance fee payment
that is consumed by the performance of legal services.4
Such a retainer is not “earned” upon receipt but rather is
tied to the performance of services. Any part of the retainer that the
lawyer has not earned by her services must be refundable to the client,
in line with the general rule that a lawyer’s normal remedy for unpaid
fees lies in quantum meruit.5
Refusal to refund unused portions of a special
retainer or fee advance traditionally has been thought to burden a client’s
right to discharge the lawyer. Our Rules allow a client broad rights
to discharge counsel without financial penalty. Rule 1.16(d) thus states
that “in connection with any termination of representation, a lawyer
shall take timely steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect
a client’s interests, such as . . . refunding any advance payment of
fee that has not been earned.” Comment [4] to Rule 1.16 explains
that “[a] client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time,
with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer’s
services” (emphasis added). Comment [4] to Rule 1.5 underscores
the proposition that “[a] lawyer may require advance payment of
a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion.” If the liability
of the discharging client is only for payment for the services actually
rendered by the lawyer, the client is not liable for the full amount
of a special retainer designed to encompass services that have not yet
been rendered.
Courts in other states have concluded that
nonrefundable special retainers violate public policy by burdening a
client’s right to discharge counsel. In In re Cooperman, 611 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1994), for example, the New York Court of Appeals concluded
that a nonrefundable special retainer burdens the client’s right to
discharge her attorney because the client will be less likely to terminate
the lawyer if the retainer is nonrefundable. The court therefore held
that nonrefundable special retainers are against public policy:
We hold that the use of a special nonrefundable retainer
fee agreement clashes with public policy because it inappropriately
compromises the right to sever the fiduciary services relationship
with the lawyer. . . . If special nonrefundable retainers are allowed to
flourish, clients would be relegated to hostage status in an unwanted
fiduciary relationship—an utter anomaly. Such circumstance would
impose a penalty on a client for daring to invoke a hollow right to
discharge.
Another problem arising from nonrefundable
special retainers arises under D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct Rule
1.5, which commands that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable,”
and enumerates a number of factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a fee, including, inter alia, the time and labor required.
In the case of a nonrefundable special retainer, the fee may be unreasonable,
and thus void, if it does not correspond to the actual services provided
by the lawyer. For example, if a lawyer is discharged by his client
shortly after receiving a nonrefundable special retainer, having performed
very little legal work for the client, the retainer may constitute an
unreasonable fee because it would bear little relation to the work performed.
In the instant situation, for example, a dissatisfied client might end
up paying an hourly fee of $4,500 if the Inquirer performs only one
hour of legal work prior to discharge. Our ethical rules therefore preclude
a lawyer from retaining all of a special retainer when the attorney-client
relationship is quickly and unexpectedly severed.6
These principles compel the conclusion that
special retainers or fee advances in this jurisdiction must be refundable.
Moreover, we conclude that the retainer in question in this case is
a special retainer which cannot be nonrefundable. The classic element
of a nonrefundable general retainer is missing from the plan; the need
to ensure the availability of a particular lawyer or law firm during
a given period of time. There is no exclusivity inherent in Inquirer’s
proposed plan; instead, the plan makes the Inquirer’s services available
to a virtually unlimited universe of clients who seek representation.
It is difficult to understand how a client, under this plan, could preclude
a rival or competitor from also retaining the Inquirer for government
contract representation during the relevant period, in the absence of
a conflict of interest under our rules. The proposed plan does not require
that the Inquirer commit its time and resources exclusively to a particular
client, or forego any opportunities for further representation during
the period in question.
Although not in itself determinative, we find
it significant that the arrangement contemplates that a specific amount
of time will be reserved, and a specific amount of legal work will be
performed in exchange for the retainer: $4,500 for “40 hours of
assistance on any federal government contracts matter(s),” meaning
payment for such legal services as “legal consultation . . . , review
of documents, legal research, or drafting and filing of documents.”
The advance fee thus is not remitted “solely to ensure the availability”
of the firm and its lawyers. Indeed, the draft brochure describing the
legal plan states that “[t]he basic Plan fee of $4,500 represents
a significant discount from [Inquirer’s] regular rates for government
contract legal services,” indicating that the fee is actually targeted
to compensate for services performed.7
This conclusion is reinforced by the plan’s provision allowing a potential
client to enroll in a “trial plan” for twenty hours of services
at a reduced fee, which provides further evidence that the payment is
tied directly to time expended.
The Inquirer suggests that D.C. Bar Opinion
155 demonstrates that the fee in this case can properly be made nonrefundable.
Opinion 155 concerned a prepaid legal services plan providing corporate,
tax and general business law services on a reduced hourly fee basis
to a non-profit organization’s tax-exempt member organizations. The
members paid a set monthly amount to reserve up to ten hours of legal
services per month. A member requiring more than ten hours per month
was charged an hourly rate based upon the member’s yearly income. The
members could accrue unused hours from month to month, but no refunds
would be made for unused guaranteed hours.
Opinion 155 does not address the issue of refundability,
and thus provides little guidance in the instant case. Instead, the
Committee in Opinion 155 was concerned about the risk that under the
plan clients might be charged an excessive fee, because the monthly
amount was paid whether or not the member actually used the hours for
which it had paid. The Committee found this risk mitigated by the small
maximum hour limitation (ten hours) and because members could accrue
unused hours and retain them. On this basis, plainly not applicable
here, the Committee upheld the validity of the fee arrangement.8
Our conclusion is not inconsistent with freedom
of contract, nor do we intend to inhibit lawyers from negotiating alternative
fee arrangements that are meant in whole or in part to compensate for
availability, exclusivity or concomitant lost opportunities. Although “‘[s]ophisticated lawyers and
clients ought to be able to use… a reasonable nonrefundable fee’
as an alternative billing method . . . ,”9
authority in other jurisdictions establishes that when an attorney is
employed under a contract stipulating a specific fee for specific services,
the attorney is entitled to recover only in quantum meruit for services
performed prior to discharge.10
This conclusion harmonizes “the right of an attorney to recover
for services he provided with the policy of instilling public confidence
in the members of an honorable profession whose relationship to clients
is personal and confidential.”11
Although we conclude that a special retainer must be nonrefundable
when the lawyer’s services are terminated before completion of the professional
engagement, this does not mean that the refund must be a proportionate
amount of the advance fee paid. In the inquiry before us, if a client
who had contracted for 40 hours of legal services for $4,500 (i.e.,
$112.50 per hour) terminated the engagement after 20 hours of service,
or half the engagement period, Rule 1.16(d) would not necessarily require
a refund of one-half the retainer. Under these circumstances, it would
not be unreasonable for the law firm to deny the client the benefit
of the original “volume discount,” and charge the client for
20 hours at its usual hourly rate. Other factors listed in Rule 1.5(a)
could also be relied on in determining the fee in the event the contract
is not completed. Of course, both the fee to be charged if the contract
is not terminated and the fee chargeable on early termination must be
reasonable under Rule 1.5(a). In addition, the basis of both fees must
be communicated in writing to the client in advance under Rule 1.5(b).
Reasonableness and the requirement of an advance writing may apply to
general retainers as well. We do not address ethics limitations applicable
to general retainers in this opinion, as the issue is not presented
by this inquiry.
Finally, merely stating in a contract that
the retainer fee is a general retainer or nonrefundable does not necessarily
make it so.12
In order to be considered a true general retainer, and hence nonrefundable,
there must be a clear indication that the retainer fee in fact is being
paid to secure the exclusive availability of the lawyer or firm and
is not intended to pay for specific services to be rendered.
Segregation of Funds
In Opinion 113, the Legal Ethics Committee rejected the view that fee
advances are “funds of a client” under DR 9-103, and therefore
concluded that such advances do not need to be placed in a separate
account. The Committee reasoned that the “funds” referred
to in DR 9-103 did not include any fees paid to the lawyer, because
that provision did not include any reference to “fees” despite
the widespread usage of that term throughout the Code. The Committee
added: “Any escrow or trust requirement over the fee advance would
defeat the objective of the fee advance: to take the attorney away from
the financial mercies of the client.” Finally, the Committee noted
that policy considerations, including the lack of discontent over the
placing of advance fees in the law firm’s general account, supported
continuing the policy of allowing commingling of advance fees.
Rule 1.15 makes this practice more explicit. Rule 1.15(d)
states: Advances of legal fees and costs become the property of the
lawyer upon receipt. Any unearned amount of prepaid fees must be returned
to the client at the termination of the lawyer’s services in accordance
with Rule 1.16(d).
It is clear from Rule 1.15(d) that any advance payment, regardless of
whether it is denominated as a general retainer, or a special retainer
or advance fee, becomes the property of the lawyer upon receipt and
does not have to be placed in an account separate from the firm’s general
account. This conclusion in no way qualifies the duty to refund fees
where appropriate, as Rule 1.15(d) itself states.
For this reason, in this jurisdiction fee advances
and general retainers should not be commingled with client funds contained
in a client trust account. Indeed, our Rule 1.15(a) specifically prohibits
commingling. We would caution, however, that other jurisdictions may
take the opposite approach and require that fee advances be placed in
a trust account until earned. Therefore, where several jurisdictions
are involved in the representation, prudent lawyers may wish to adopt
a conservative approach and segregate fee advances from both the law
firm’s assets and from assets of other clients which may be contained
in a client trust account.
Possibly conflicting approaches to this question
highlight the need for a lawyer to decide which ethical rules apply
to the situation. Our Rule 8.5 embodies the notion that traditional
choice of law principles may apply to the determination of what ethical
rules apply to a given situation. Where the lawyer is licensed to practice
only in this jurisdiction, performs work only in this jurisdiction for
clients in this jurisdiction, and both receives and maintains bank accounts
within this jurisdiction, it is clear that the District of Columbia
Rules of Professional Conduct apply and fee advances may be considered
the lawyer’s property upon receipt. As the situation diverges from this
exclusively District of Columbia paradigm, however, members of our Bar
should take care to ensure that they are in compliance with the rules
of any other jurisdiction which may control the situation.
Inquiry No. 95-5-14
Adopted: February 14, 1996
- Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1993). See
also Alexander K. McKinnon, Analytical Approaches to the Nonrefundable
Retainer, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 583 (1996); 1 S. Speiser, Attorney’s
Fees §§ 1.4, 1:8 (1973) (“A true retainer is payment
given to a lawyer to compensate for the client’s right to the
lawyer’s services. The retainer is earned when received because
the lawyer gives up the right to work for others and the client has
received this promise of exclusivity.”); State Bar of Texas Professional
Ethics Comm. Op. 431 (June 1986) (“[A] retainer is that non-refundable
fee paid by a client to secure an attorney’s availability over
a given period of time . . .” (citing Wash. State Bar Ass’n
Op. 173 (Oct. 1980)); 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 282 (1980)
(“A true retainer is not a payment for services. It is an advance
fee to secure a lawyer’s services, and remunerate him for loss
of the opportunity to accept other employment.”); Brickman &
Cunningham, supra, at 6 (“[A]n attorney must promptly refund any
part of an advance fee that has not been earned except if the fee is
identified as a true retainer, defined as a fee paid, solely for the
purpose of ensuring the availability of the lawyer for a matter or for
a given period of time.”) (emphasis added) (citing Calif. Rules
of Professional Conduct Rules 3-700(D)(2), 4-100(b) (1989)).
- See, e.g., State Bar of Tex. Professional
Ethics Comm. Op. 431 (June 1986); Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Op.
87-1 (Sept. 1987); N.J. Advisory Comm. On Professional Ethics Op.
644 (1990).
- note 2, supra. “Availability
is the essence of a general retainer.,” Restatement of the Law,
The Law Governing Lawyers 46, cmt. e, at 213 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1991),
cited in Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 2, at 23. “Indeed,
a primary justification for ‘retainers’ in any situation
is the assurance that the lawyer’s time will be available to the
client if and when needed, an arrangement which may “preclude
other employment by the lawyer.” D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op.
155 (1985) (citing DR 2-106(B)(2) [Rule 1.5(a)(1)]).
- & Cunningham, supra note 1,
at 5-6. Special retainers may take many forms, including an advance
to be applied against hourly rates or a flat fee designed to cover provision
of specified legal services.
- See generally Kin Cheung Wong v. Kennedy,
853 F. Supp. 73, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing In re Cooperman, 1994 WL
84413 (N.Y.) at *3 (Mar. 17, 1994)).
- N.C. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm.
Op. 106 (Apr. 11, 1991) (ruling that lawyer had to return any amount
in excess of reasonable fee when state voluntarily dismissed charges
against his client). See also McKinnon, supra note 1, at 588 (noting
that prohibition on lawyer acquiring proprietary interest in a cause
of action also may be implicated by certain nonrefundable retainers.)
- In re Hathaway Ranch Partnership, 116
Bankr. 208, 216 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990), the court stated that:
[a] true earned upon receipt retainer is one paid to a lawyer
for which the only consideration exchanged is the promise to represent
the client and no other party in the particular matter. The consideration
cannot include logically the provision of future services if the retainer
is truly earned upon receipt (citing In re C&P Auto Transport,
Inc., 94 Bankr. 682, 687 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988)).
- Op. 155 also is distinct from this
case in that the lawyer-client relationship was with an organization
to which individual members belonged, rather than directly between
the law firm and an individual client. Such arrangements commonly arise
in pre-paid legal services plans maintained by labor unions, under which
the union pays a specific fee to ensure the availability of its law
firm to represent union members on certain matters. We are not confronted
by that situation in this case, and do not address it. Inquirer also
relies on D.C. Op. 113, which deals with the safekeeping of fee advances
and not with refundability. We do not view D.C. Op. 113 as pertinent
to the issue placed before us on this occasion.
- A. Adams, Fallout From Fee Decision:
Some Arrangements Doomed, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 21, 1994, at 1 (quoting Stephen
Gillers).
- Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Offices Union,
645 A.2d 1248 (N.J. Super. 1994); Jacobson v. Sassower, 474 N.Y.S.2d
107 (1983).
- , 645 A.2d at 1259.
- Kin Cheung Wong v. Kennedy, 853 F. Supp.
73, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Merely reciting the language ‘shall
be deemed earned’ does not convert the Retainer Agreement into
a general retainer . . . there is nothing in the Retainer Agreement
to indicate that the payment was made in exchange for [the lawyer’s]
availability.”); State Bar of Tex. Professional Ethics Comm. Op.
431 (June 1986) (“A fee is not earned simply because it is designated
as nonrefundable.”)
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